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Abstract
The Solar energy is playing a fundamental role in the transition to a low carbon electricity 
production system. Driven by rapidly decreasing prices for solar installations in the last years, 
the solar energy market in Europe is currently undergoing a transformation. Subsidies such 
as feed-in tariffs are being phased out and replaced with the possibility to self-consume solar 
energy, earning a profit by buying less electricity from the grid. This change creates 
opportunities for new innovative business models such as the one examined in this study. 
Concretely, this study carries out an explorative case study to assess the financial viability of a 
business model for small-scale investors in off-site solar energy in Switzerland and in 
Portugal. Additionally, interviews with potential investors have been made to explore 
perceived advantages and disadvantages and to analyse how the saving and investment 
preferences of potential investors align with this business model. The study concludes that 
the examined business model is financially viable for medium sized projects in Switzerland 
but even more for large projects in in Portugal. However, a number of challenges have been 
identified. For instance, legal questions in regard to ownership and guaranteeing the 
continued operation need to be resolved. Additionally, very efficient management procedures 
by the implementing company are required to bring down administrative costs and to ensure 
its own financial viability, which is mandatory to earn buyers’ trust and money.
Keywords: Solar Energy, Renewable Energy, Investment Decision Process, Sustainable 
Investment, Business Models, Switzerland, Portugal
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Executive Summary
Problem statement
Solar energy has the highest energy potential of  all renewable energy technologies and plays 
a key role in the quest to address climate change by replacing fossil fuels with less carbon 
intensive energy sources. Due to recent substantial price reductions it can now compete with 
fossil fuels in a growing number of  countries. Consequently, the solar energy market is 
rapidly expanding on a global scale.
In Europe, a shift towards phasing out subsidies for solar energy takes place. In parallel, 
economic difficulties particularly in southern European countries (e.g. Portugal) reduce 
available public and private capital for investments in energy. At the same time, citizens of  
prosperous countries in central, western and northern Europe (e.g. Switzerland) can save 
significant amounts of  money but face a dearth of  profitable and safe investment 
possibilities. The concurrence of  these developments creates opportunities for new business 
models. In this study the economic and legal viability of  a business model for small-scale 
investors in off-site solar energy (SOIS) and investors’ preferences are examined. 
Research Questions
1. How viable is the SOIS business model in Switzerland and in Portugal from a 
financial and legal perspective?
2. How does the SOIS business model fulfil investment criteria for Swiss small scale 
investors?
Examined Business Model
Aurel Schmid, IIIEE, Lund University
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The buyer purchases a panel from the Solar Service Company, which installs the panel on a 
roof, sells the electricity and transfers 80% of  the revenue to the buyer while keeping 20% 
under a long-term contract. The business model is innovative because the buyers can invest 
small amounts of  money in tangible solar panels, legally own and sell them as needed, 
increasing flexibility.
Methods
Literature research was used to define business models, to determine parameters of  the Swiss 
and the Portuguese solar market and to provide theoretical insights into investment decision 
processes. Interviews with experts from the solar industry, banks and lawyers complemented 
these insights, allowing the author to identify legal challenges and to build valid financial 
models for four scenarios in both Switzerland and Portugal. Interviews with 20 potential 
customers provided insights into their saving and investment preferences and assessed 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of  the SOIS business model.
Results
Results show that it is more profitable for buyers to have their panels installed in Portugal 
than in Switzerland. However, because potential buyers preferred little time investment and 
little risk over financial return, also the medium Swiss scenario may be acceptable for buyers.  
The interviewed potential investors generally confirmed the hypothesised advantages of  the 
SOIS business model. Namely they appreciate: a small and low risk investment opportunity 
in a concrete object providing an environmental benefit while limiting their administrative 
burden and yielding a better return than their current savings. A majority of  interviewees said 
that they would consider buying a solar panel with the SOIS business model.
Perceived disadvantages include doubts about the financial viability of  the Solar Service 
Company. Also, interviewees mention the need of  the company to build trust and provide 
transparent information in order to overcome risk aversion and several misconceptions 
about solar energy such as long energy payback time and high cost of  solar panels.
The study also finds a major legal challenge linked to guaranteeing the ongoing operation of  
the solar panels in the case of  an insolvency of  the Solar Service Company. Special Purpose 
Entities may provide a solution to this issue but this requires further research.
Conclusion
The author concludes that the SOIS business model may be financially viable and attractive 
to a significant group of  interviewees provided that the legal challenges can be resolved.
Financial Viability 
Scenarios 1-4
Panel buying price
Net revenue per panel (25 years)
Payback time
Internal rate of return
Switzerland 
small (5 kWp)
€546
€112 
20.8 years
0.5%
Switzerland 
medium (30 kWp)
€507
€474
13.1 years
4.7%
Switzerland 
large (400 kWp)
€468 
€240
16.6 years
2.4%
Portugal   
large (400 kWp)
€338 
€623 
8.9 years
8.3%
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1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Global low-carbon energy supply needs to increase three to seven-fold over the next 35 years 
in order to limit atmospheric concentration of  CO2, addressing climate change in line with 
scientific recommendations (IPCC, 2014). From all low-carbon technologies, solar energy has 
the largest energy generation potential and will play a crucial role in the required energy 
transition (IPCC, 2014; Massachusetts Institute of  Technology, 2015).
On a global level, Germany has initially led the ongoing solar energy expansion but is now 
being overtaken by China, Japan and the US while more and more countries on all continents 
start installing significant amounts of  solar power (IEA PVPS, 2015; Kurz, 2015; Morgan 
Stanley, 2014). Several authors suggest that it is technically and economically possible to have 
industrialised countries fully powered by renewables (Jacobson et al., 2015; Roselund, 2015). 
The biggest challenge to realise solar energy’s potential is no longer technical but how to 
accelerate a positive change in the attitudes of  people (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012).
In Europe, the solar energy market is being transformed rapidly. Given the decreasing costs 
of  renewable energy in general and solar energy in particular and its rapidly increasing 
market share in recent years, many countries are reviewing and adjusting energy policies 
(International Energy Agency, 2015b). Subsidies for solar energy are being phased out (Patel, 
2014), which triggers an important restructuring of  the sector towards a situation where it 
will need to compete in increasingly liberalised markets, sometimes against subsidised nuclear 
(BBC News, 2013) and fossil fuels (Coady, Parry, Sears, & Shang, 2015). 
While some countries and most notably Germany have managed to mobilise substantial 
private investments and reached significant levels of  solar energy capacity (Parkinson, 2014), 
various countries in southern Europe did not capitalise as much on their much better solar 
resources (Tsagas, 2014). For example, Portugal has installed a cumulative capacity of  only 
281 MW at the end of  2013, considerably less than the 756 MW in much smaller and less 
sunny Switzerland (Jäger-Waldau, 2014). One of  the reasons is the deep economic crisis in 
many of  southern European countries triggering public budget constraints and a net loss of  
economic output and also income for individuals over the last 10 years (Eurostat, 2015b). 
Scarcity of  both public and private capital impede investments in economically viable solar 
energy. At the same time many countries in central, western and northern Europe are 
economically well off  (2015b). As an example, in 2013 Swiss citizens were able to save CHF 
1 329 (EUR 1 227)1 2 on average (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2015a). Because this figure 
includes children, adults with a regular income can most likely save significantly more per 
year on average. Research indicates that they put much of  these savings in bank saving 
accounts (Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2014). However, in times of  near zero interest 
rates this may not be a financially sound strategy. Figures for Germany indicate that 
1 Swiss Francs have been converted to Euros at the rate of  CHF 1 = EUR 0.92 during August 2015 throughout this study 
using data from the European Central Bank.
2 In order to avoid any confusion about how to interpret currencies and numbers, the author divides digits into groups of  
three separated by spaces and with a period as the decimal mark. This is in line with the European style recommendation 
for English language publications (Europa: Publication Office, 2015a; Europa: Publication Office, 2015b), which is based 
on a decision of  the International Bureau of  Weights and Measures (2003). 
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Germans currently have EUR 1.4 trillion in their bank saving accounts and lose about USD 
13 billion a year because low interest rates fail to make up for inflation and fees (Seibel, 
2012). 
In many European countries, a significant share of  the population lives in rented apartments. 
As an example, in Switzerland in 2012 only 37% of  households owned the apartment or 
house they were living in (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2014). Therefore, they were largely 
excluded from the solar market and unable to take advantage of  existing incentives for house 
owners to build solar energy installations.
The concurrence of  dynamic solar energy markets in need for new investments, changing 
regulatory frameworks and the high percentage of  tenants in several European countries 
with available saving capital that cannot build solar panels on their roofs creates needs and 
opportunities for new innovative business models. This thesis carries out an explorative case 
study of  a novel business model that could potentially address these needs and may be able 
to take advantage of  the current developments in the solar market.
1.2 Solar Business Models
Several business models for the deployment of  solar energy have emerged and have been 
implemented in recent years.
Third-party ownership business model are very successful in the USA and provide house-
owners with guaranteed cost-savings at no upfront costs (Coughlin & Cory, 2009; Drury et 
al., 2012; Overholm, 2015; Sherwood, 2007; Solar Energy Industries Association, 2012). In 
other countries, different regulatory frameworks and context variables have led to different 
business models. In Germany, the Host-Owned Feed-in Model (Strupeit & Palm, 2015) has 
proved to be very successful. In this model, home-owners finance solar installations and sell 
the produced electricity to the grid at a long-term guaranteed and profitable rate, known as a 
feed-in tariff  (Couture & Gagnon, 2010; European Photovoltaic Industry Association, 2014; 
Klein, Held, Ragwitz, Resch, & Faber, 2007; Mendonca, Jacobs, & Sovacool, 2009; Ringel, 
2006; Spertino, Di Leo, & Cocina, 2013). 
Some business models are specifically catering to small-scale investors that do not want or 
cannot build solar panels on their own roof. Associations and cooperatives allow citizens, 
usually from a geographically defined area, to invest jointly in a project (Debor, 2014; 
Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz, 2015) and are considered to be a very safe investment 
option (German Wind Energy Association, 2012). According to Fuhs (2015) the possibility 
to vote and influence the development of an organisation is a very important aspect of these 
business models. However, the possibility to participate in decisions clearly also requires 
more time and personal involvement than other forms of investment and may be considered 
an inconvenience by some citizens (Yildiz, 2014). Closed-end funds are another investment 
tool that enables investors to invest small amounts of money in renewable energy projects. 
However, they do not allow to have a say in business decision making and limit investors’ 
liability if a project fails (Gross, 2013; Romero-Rubio & de Andrés Díaz, 2015). Closed-end 
funds also involve significant risks because they are served after the interests of banks and 
therefore shareholders generally lose all their investment in an insolvency of the project 
(Yildiz, 2014). 
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Other options such as crowdfunding (Veolis, 2015), opportunities to buy shares in local 
utilities’ solar panels (Elektrizitätswerk Zürich, 2015) or the possibility for investors to buy 
claims to revenue from selling solar electricity (Greenxmoney, 2015) are emerging and may 
be interesting to small-scale investors.
The scope of  this study is one particular business model. The Small-Scale Off-Site 
Investment in Solar Energy (SOIS) business model is inspired by the US-based startup 
Cloudsolar (Cloudsolar, 2015). In essence, it allows buyers3, to purchase solar panels from a 
Solar Service Company (SSC)4 and then to contract this company to install and operate the 
panels and to sell electricity over a given period of  time against a share of  revenues. The 
business model is innovative because the buyers can invest small amounts of  money in 
tangible solar panels, legally own and sell them as needed increasing flexibility and potentially 
reducing financial risk. A positive side effect of  this procedure that will be examined in this 
study is the possibility to install the panels in another country in order to realise additional 
benefits. 
In this explorative study, it is hypothesised that the SOIS addresses some of  the problems 
discussed above. Namely, it provides a safe and profitable way for tenants without access to a 
suitable roof  and generally for savers in well-off  countries to invest small amounts of  money 
in solar power generation. It is assumed to reduce investment risk because buyers retain 
ownership over their panels even in the case of  a default of  the SSC. Additionally, it can 
mobilise new investments from people without roof-ownership and therefore provide a net 
increase of  available funds to develop a viable solar sector in places that lack the necessary 
capital to do so on their own. 
A rough and hypothetical breakdown of  available capital in Germany as the largest country 
in Europe in terms of  population and economic output demonstrates the potential of  the 
model. As mentioned above, Germans have put EUR 1.4 trillion in bank saving accounts. 
Assuming investment costs5 in Portugal are EUR 1.4 per Wp (compare to chapter 4.2.3), this 
capital could finance the construction of  more than 1 000 GW of  solar panels, annually 
producing 1 500 TWh of  electricity almost equalling 2.5 times the gross German electricity 
production in 2012 (International Energy Agency, 2015a). This calculation is of  course very 
much simplified and based on rather unlikely investment decision assumptions but it shows 
nonetheless that even a small fraction of  the available capital would enable very significant 
investment in solar energy.
Several elements of  this argument such as the availability of  saved capital, structural change 
in the solar energy market and need of  new capital in the solar power market as well as 
increasing profitability of  solar investments in the long-term are based on hard facts. 
However, the model also relies on several assumptions. For instance, it is hypothesised that 
the model can offer acceptable financial returns on investment for the panel owner even if  
3 The terms investors, buyers and customers are used interchangeably in this study. As a matter of  fact the SOIS business 
model features elements of  both activities. Customers buy, own and trade a solar panel much like they buy other long-
term goods such as house property. However, since the panel earns a profit, the solar panel is also an investment object. 
From a psychological point of  view the term buyer is preferred because investor can have a negative connotation of  
acting speculatively in non-transparent and risky transactions.
4 Henceforth the company that implements the SOIS business model will be referred to as the Solar Service Company (SSC).
5 Henceforth, investment costs refer to the combined cost of  the solar panel and the non-module so-called balance of  system 
(BOS) cost.
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the SSC takes a share of  revenues, that the possibility to own a tangible good such as a solar 
panel is attractive to the target buyer group and that it effectively protects the investment in 
case of  default of  the SSC. In other words, the question is if  the SOIS business model 
responds to one or multiple needs of  investors and if  there is a significant group of  
investors potentially interested in such a business model. Also, being implemented in the 
USA (Cloudsolar, 2015) but untested in Europe, such a business model still has to prove its 
financial profitability and legal viability in the current changing market conditions in Europe. 
Being a new concept, these questions have not yet been answered in the literature and the 
study addresses relevant knowledge gaps.
1.3 Research Questions
This study aims at contributing to the understanding of  the growing variety of  business 
models in the solar energy market. More concretely, its objective is first to establish the 
financial and legal viability of  the SOIS business model in Switzerland and in Portugal and 
second to research investment decision criteria, preferences and attitudes of  potential 
customers in Switzerland towards this business model. Therefore, the two following research 
questions are being examined.
1. How viable is the SOIS business model in Switzerland and in Portugal from a 
financial and legal perspective?
2. How does the SOIS business model fulfil investment criteria for Swiss small 
scale investors?
1.4 Research Approach
The stated research questions will be answered using an explorative case study featuring four 
financial scenarios built on literature review and interviews as well as an analysis of  potential 
investors’ preferences in regard to the SOIS business model. 
Literature review will be used to look into business model and investors’ decision-making 
theory. This theory part will provide the necessary knowledge to define what elements of  
business models shall be examined and to deduct interview questions to be asked in the case 
study. See chapter 2 for detailed information. 
Literature review complemented with the results from nine expert interviews will provide 
insights into the legal and financial aspects of  the solar markets in Switzerland and in 
Portugal. This information serves to build a financial model featuring four scenarios. The 
three Swiss scenarios will look at different installation sizes subject to different subsidy 
schemes in Switzerland. The fourth scenario will look at the Portuguese market assuming the 
same size as the large-scale Swiss scenario ensuring comparability with the Swiss scenarios. 
Findings in regard to the financial viability of  the different scenarios as well as legal viability 
will allow extracting relevant questions and providing necessary background information for 
the 20 interviews with potential buyers of  the solar panels. The interviewees will be asked 
about their criteria for investment decisions and their risk-taking preferences. The 
interviewer will also explain and provide information about the SOIS business model 
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including regarding its financial and legal viability and then ask about perceived advantages 
and disadvantages as well as about general attitudes towards the SOIS business model. 
Additionally, interviewees will be asked whether they might accept to have their panels 
installed in Portugal.
Information on how these data has been collected can be found in chapter 3. 
Switzerland and Portugal were chosen because of  the Swiss financial saving capacity 
combined with relatively poor solar resources and the Portuguese excellent solar resources 
coupled with financial constraints and the recent passing of  a new bill allowing self-
consumption of  produced solar electricity. Tenants and people without suitable roofs were 
chosen as the main target group because most existing business models and incentives focus 
on house owners and fail to cater to the interests and needs of  the majority of  people, which 
are tenants, in several European countries. 
A discussion on the limitations and generalisability can be found in section 5.6.2.
1.5 Target Audience
This study targets a professional audience such as potential investors and companies active in 
the solar market in Switzerland and Portugal and also new companies planning to implement 
the SOIS business model. The examination of  the subsidy landscape and financial market 
conditions may also offer interesting insights for solar professionals, policy makers and 
researchers that want to keep track of  the very dynamic solar market and of  new emerging 
business models. Therefore, the audience is expected to have a basic technical understanding 
of  energy markets, electricity and of  measuring the output of  a solar panel as well as a basic 
understanding of  economic terms and investment reflections.
1.6 Structure
After this introduction, the investment decision process as well as decision criteria of  small-
scale investors are examined from a theoretical perspective. Furthermore, business models 
and their typical components will be defined based on literature research. These insights are 
used to develop pertinent questions for the interviews with experts and potential buyers.
In the third chapter the data collection is presented and the use of  literature research and 
semi-structured interviews for the case study are explained. 
In the fourth chapter, the results of  the explorative case study are presented. Four financial 
scenarios for different solar installation dimensions, three for Switzerland and one for 
Portugal are developed, legal aspects are elaborated and the investment criteria and attitudes 
of  the target group of  buyers towards the SOIS business model are explained. 
In chapter five, the findings regarding the two research questions are analysed and discussed. 
Also, the methodological choices and generalisability of  the study are reflected upon in this 
chapter.
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Finally, in chapter six the major conclusions in regard to the research questions and 
suggestions for future research are presented.
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2 Investment Decision and Business Model Theories
2.1 Investment Decision Theory
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical debate on investment decision 
processes for renewable energy. This knowledge will then be used to deduct relevant 
interviews questions for the case study with a view to answer the second research question 
about the investment criteria for small-scale investors in solar energy and whether the SOIS 
business model satisfies these criteria. 
Starting from the classical investment theory, where investors rationally balance risks and 
revenues (Markowitz, 1959), the author adopts Wüstenhagen and Menichetti’s (2012) 
extended framework for renewable energy investments. The framework is complemented 
with a short elaboration on how psychological factors such as values, identity, emotional 
involvement as well as national cultural investment dispositions influence the depicted 
cognitive process.
The SOIS business model can be looked at under the angle of buying a good or making an 
investment. Purchasing a solar panel is a long-term buying decision similar to buying a car 
although with a lower cost to the purchaser. However, a solar panel pays back incrementally 
over time and over the duration of the investment provides a financial return, which may not 
be the case or not be the primary concern with most other goods. First and foremost, it is 
thus a financial investment and this will be the focus of analysis in this study. 
2.1.1 Classical Investment Theory
According to classical investment theory, investors make investment decisions based on their 
rational preferences regarding risk and return, which are mostly determined by policy 
decisions and the market environment of a particular investment opportunity (Markowitz, 
1959). This is pictured in figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Neoclassical Investment Decision Model
Source: Wüstenhagen and Menichetti (2012)
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Given the empirical fact that people sometimes make irrational decisions, this neoclassical 
theory has been challenged by behavioural economists, who focus on cognitive limitations 
and abilities of decision makers and how these affects economic decision-making processes 
(Brekke & Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Pollitt & Shaorshadze, 
2011). Masini and Menichetti (2013) provides further evidence that investors do not invest 
according to a purely rational evaluation of investment alternatives. Von Lüde (2013) notes 
that risk perception is highly subjective. Sachse (2008) confirms this view and shows that 
adding psychological factors to the standard economic factors significantly improves the 
explanatory power of her empirical model for making investment decisions. Sonnberger 
(2014) criticises the neoclassical theory on the ground that it does not delve into the 
motivation of investors for their preferences and argues that the theory needs to be 
complemented. 
In the next sections, a non-exhaustive list of additional elements for a decision to invest in 
renewable energy identified in the literature will be presented.
2.1.2 Perceived Risk and Return
One important insight into investors’ evaluation of risk and return is the understanding that 
the objective risk – which may be an entirely theoretical concept – is largely irrelevant and 
perceived risk and expected revenues matter above all for decisions under uncertainty 
(Wüstenhagen & Menichetti, 2012). Consequently, policy makers should focus on reducing 
perceived risks for investors in order to increase investments in renewable energy. Numerous 
authors elaborate on what determines the perception of risks and revenues by investors. 
Apparently, investors perceive higher risks for business models that depend on subsidies that 
can be removed by policy decisions (Brandhoff, 2015). Generally, beliefs and trust in a 
specific technology as well as in the efficiency of the market shape perceived risks and 
expected revenues (Masini & Menichetti, 2012). Interestingly, the same authors conclude that 
perceived trust in technology is more important for investment decisions than perceived 
effectiveness and stability of policies. Stephan, Barasinska and Schäfer (2008) identify safety 
and liquidity as primary concerns. Sachse (2008) finds that worry (risk aversion), volatility, 
novelty and unpredictability of an investment are the most important factors for perceived 
risk. However, in her empirical research she finds no evidence that perceived risks and 
revenues alone explain the decision to invest (2008). Only by accounting for other 
psychological aspects can his model produce significant explanation value for investment 
decisions (2008). 
2.1.3 Portfolio Aspects
Markowitz was among the first to argue that combining different assets reduces the risk of a 
portfolio (Markowitz, 1959).  Stephan et al. (2008) confirms this and finds evidence that the 
acceptability of risk increases if an investor has a broad portfolio. From these insights Frijns, 
Koellen and Lehnert (2008) conclude that investments in solar energy can be seen as a 
diversification of the portfolio of an investor and thus lower the risk of that portfolio. This is 
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also true for small-scale investors that have most of their savings in just one bank saving 
account, which as the recent financial crisis has shown, also involves a certain amount of risk. 
Therefore, according to Masini & Menichetti (2013) investments in renewable energy should 
not be considered by its stand-alone risks and returns alone but by its contribution to a 
portfolio’s risk diversification. The same authors argue that because of this, investments into 
renewable energy as part of a diversification strategy may be reasonable even if risks for 
putting all savings in such an investment would be considered too high. 
2.1.4 Socio-Demographic Factors
The link between demographic factors and the willingness to invest in renewable energy has 
been examined by numerous authors. Hochguerter, Allesie and Van Soest (1997) and Fessler 
and Schürz (2008) note that higher educated people with better salaries are more likely to 
invest in alternative investment options. Linked to this statement, higher levels of education 
and income seem to be positively related to buying renewable electricity (Diaz-Rainey & 
Ashton, 2011; Ek & Söderholm, 2008; Rowlands, Scott, & Parker, 2003; Sonnberger, 2014; 
Tabi, Hille, & Wüstenhagen, 2014; Welsch & Kühling, 2009). However, not all demographic 
factors seem to influence investment behaviour. Sachse (2008), states that age, gender, family 
status do not influence the perception of financial risks. 
Concluding, the literature suggests that higher levels of education and income positively 
influence the likelihood of investing in renewable energy. Therefore, these factors may also 
increase the interest for the SOIS business model among such people. This is why in the 
interview sample (see chapter 3.2.3) people with above-average education level are over-
represented. 
2.1.5 Cognitive Aspects and Bounded Rationality
As stated in section 2.1.1, there are many indications that investors are in fact not as rational 
as classical investment theory suggests and rely on other criteria as well for investment 
decisions (Masini & Menichetti, 2013). Sachse (2008) finds no evidence in her empirical 
research that revenue and risks alone influence the decision to invest. Only by accounting for 
psychological aspects can her model produce significant explanatory value for investment 
decisions. In the following sub-sections examples for bounded rationality will be shortly 
presented.
Path Dependency
Path dependency is the tendency of individuals and organisations to repeat a certain 
behaviour based on positive outcomes in the past (North, 1990). In the investment field, it 
can slow capital investments into emerging sectors and notably into the renewable energy 
sector (Wüstenhagen & Teppo, 2006). One explanation is the so-called financial illiteracy 
making people stick to what they know and reluctant to adopt new saving instruments due of 
lack of knowledge and due to a high level of trust in their bank’s recommendations (von 
Lüde, 2013). Focussing more on psychological aspects, Welsch and Kühling (2009) note that 
people repeat choices that are satisfying and only strive to optimise choices if results are 
clearly unsatisfactory. See also the elaboration of involvement in the next section. The fact 
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that many Swiss often stick to loss-making savings accounts (von Lüde, 2013) indicates that 
lacking return on investment alone is not enough unsettling to make them change their 
behaviour. Or in other words, loss-making saving behaviour may be acceptable because to 
break with what is apparently normal would entail even higher dissatisfaction (2013).
Values and Involvement
Many citizens value environmental protection, regional benefits and participation when 
making investment decisions (Fuhs, 2015). Sonnberger (2014) provides some detail for this 
line of argument. According to him, values only come into play if a decision requires a high 
level of involvement. Involvement can be defined as follows: ”Involvement implies attention 
to something because it is somehow relevant or important” (Ratchford, 1987, p. 25). 
Solomon, Russell-Bennett and Previte (2012) identify a ”high probability of a wrong 
purchase and a high subjective importance of the potential negative consequences” as factors 
for high involvement (p. 134). Sonnberger (2014) points out, that investment in solar may 
trigger involvement because choosing and changing an investment instrument is generally 
considered to be an important decision with significant potential negative consequences. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that values may interfere with rational decision making in 
investment decisions.
Loss Aversion
In his empirical study Sachse (2008) indicates worry about loss, volatility, novelty and 
unpredictability as the most significant factors determining risk perception (2008). She also 
provides evidence that a positive reputation of an industry as well as the target country of an 
investment influence the investment decision but has no influence on the perceived risk.
Status
Welsch (2009) notes that investment into solar systems is driven by a desire for status 
(Mercedes-Benz on the rooftop). The interviews will examine whether status is an important 
motivator for the target group of this study. Related to status, Bollinger and Gillingham 
(2012) identify a peer effect by comparing solar instalment levels per zip code. According to 
them: ”a one percent increase in the zip code installed base increases the adoption rate by 
just over five percent, with the exact value depending on the current adoption rate in the zip 
code” (2012, p. 31). He also notes links to socio-demographic variables that are often related 
to zip codes (see section 2.1.4).
Belief in Technology
It sounds obvious but needs to be highlighted: Beliefs in the technical viability of a 
technology play a fundamental role for investment decisions into that technology (Masini & 
Menichetti, 2013).
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Interest
Fessler and Schürz (2008) point to another very obvious psychological phenomenon: 
interest. Interviewees in his study frequently pointed out that they are just not interested 
enough and too lazy to constantly keep up with their investment. In line with the 
involvement discussion above, they choose instruments that do not require time effort and 
that are already known to them, namely savings accounts.
National Saving Preferences
Specific national cultural dispositions in regard to savings and investment are thought to play 
a significant role in investment decisions. In the following, results from a survey that was 
carried out in Switzerland by Goldman Sachs (2014) will be presented. According to this 
survey Swiss citizens put safety first as far as savings are concerned. First and foremost they 
have their savings in bank saving accounts - despite very low interest rates currently at 0.11% 
on average (Schweizer Banken.info, 2015). According to Goldman Sachs (2014) more than 
60% have not changed their saving policies lately. Only after safety concerns have been 
satisfied and a large enough stock is secured may people consider riskier options such as 
equity. 30% are currently somewhat invested in equity and only 10% in corporate bonds. 
Asked about how they would invest additional money, the highest percentage would buy real 
estate followed by the ones putting more in savings accounts. Only 20% would buy more 
equity, less than share of Swiss that already have invested in equity, which indicates a 
tendency to divest from equity.
2.1.6 Framework for Investment Decision Making
As announced in the introduction to this chapter, this section collates insights into one 
framework of how small-scale investors make a decision to invest in renewable energy.
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Figure 2-2. Investment Decision-Making Framework 
Source: Author, inspired by Wüstenhagen and Menichetti (2012)
The core of the framework is the insight that decisions are not based on rational 
consideration or facts regarding risk, revenue, demographic variables or portfolio aspects, 
pictures outside the bubble in the framework. Rather decisions are made in a cognitive 
process influenced by bounded rationality that alters these factual elements with 
psychological factors such as interest, path dependency, status, culture, belief in technology, 
values and risk aversion, picture inside the bubble. The outcome of this process is a notion 
of a perceived risk of an investment and of an expected return as well as other perceived 
advantages and disadvantages. These are then considered in order to make a decision for or 
against an investment and for or against a particular business model. 
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This understanding is fundamental to recognise the importance of interviewing people and 
learning about their attitudes and perceived advantages and disadvantages. In other words: 
without this insight serving as a justification for interviews, the study may have limited itself 
to comparing the return and risks calculated in the financial model to the ones associated 
with bank accounts and then concluded about the investment likeliness of investors. 
Interviewing potential customers and asking them about their attitudes and preferences 
allows the author to explore the relevancy of psychological factors and cognitive processes. 
2.1.7   Conclusion in Regard to the Interview Questionnaire
The insights from this chapter, synthesised in the decision-making framework provide a 
suitable base for developing interview questions. Questions ask about past saving behaviour, 
investment motivations and criteria, attitudes and interest towards the environment, solar 
energy technology and alternative investment instruments, importance of status, community 
and ownership and perceived advantages and disadvantages of the SOIS business model. 
2.2 Business Models and Their Contextual Environment
In this section first a definition of the term business model and an overview of typical criteria 
for evaluating business models are provided. Insights from this section help determining the 
aspects of the SOIS business model, that this study will focus on. More detailed information 
about the SOIS business model and how it relates to insights from this section are provided 
in section 4.1.1.
Several authors state that despite the recognised practical importance of business models, 
little academic research deals with them (Hedman & Kalling, 2003; Zott & Amit, 2010). 
Consequently, there is also a lack of a generally accepted definition of what a business model 
is (Al-Debei & Avison, 2010). Morris, Schindehutte and Allen (2005) note that the diversity 
of definitions create challenges for determining core components, typologies and criteria for 
good business models. Mäkinen and Seppänen (2007) suggest that a business model explains 
how a company can operationalise its strategy. According to Raphael and Zott (2001) ”a 
business models depicts the content, structure, and governance of transactions designed so 
as to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities” (2001, p. 511). Adding 
more details and focusing more on decisions and competitive advantages, Morris et al. (2005) 
define business models as ”a concise representation of how an interrelated set of decision 
variables in the areas of venture strategy, architecture, and economics are addressed to create 
sustainable competitive advantage in defined markets” (p. 727). Summarising, it is retained 
that, business models concisely describe what the business is and how the business is 
organised in order to create economic value and a sustainable competitive advantage in a 
defined market.
Several authors suggest sets of elements of business models (Hedman & Kalling, 2003; 
Wirtz, 2010); Raphael 2001; Zott 2010). This study adopts the concept developed by Morris 
et al. (2005). These authors develop a concept comprising six components on the basis of a 
meta-analysis of 18 scientific studies on business models. Their concept is presented in table 
2-1.
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Table 2-1. Components of Business Models
Source: Morris et al. (2005)
Morris et al. (2005) then go on and identify three levels where the components can be 
analysed. This study focuses on the first, the foundation level and does not present the 
proprietary and the rules levels. In order to achieve the research objective and answer the 
research question, the following components will be prioritised.  
• The Offer links to the second research question and is basically what the SOIS business 
model offers and how it works. More information can be found in section 4.1.1. 
• Finances refers to the first research question about financial viability and is looked at in 
the case study in section 4.2. 
• The Market refers to the second research question about the target customers and their 
needs. Further inside is gained through the interviews, whose results are presented in 
section 4.4. 
It is important to note that business models do not succeed or fail because of their strengths 
and weaknesses alone. On the contrary, they are always implemented in specific contexts that 
often play a decisive role for their performance. For the SOIS business model, factors such 
as electricity prices, incentive structure, technological progress but also culture, mentalities 
and the availability of capital as well as saving opportunities determine whether or not it can 
be successful in the market or not. This is why, the research questions and linked to them, 
the data collection aim at providing information about the contexts in which the SOIS 
business model is examined.
Components of  business models
The offer
The market
Internal capabilities
Competition
Finances
Growth
Questions to ask
How does the firm create value?
For whom does it create value? Nature and scope of  the market and 
customers.
What skills does the company have, what is it particularly good at?
What is the company better at than the competition?
How will the firm make money? What are fixed and variable costs, 
margins, etc.
What is the time, scope and size ambition of  the company / of  the 
entrepreneur?
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3 Data Collection
In this chapter it will be explained what data was collected with what method and ethical 
considerations will be presented. Based on the two frameworks described in the earlier 
chapter, data has been collected on the offer, the market and the finances of  the SOIS 
business model as well as on the investment decision processes, preferences and attitudes of  
potential customers.
3.1 Literature Research
Literature research provided background information on financial and legal aspects of  the 
business model as well as on investment needs of  potential buyers. Information from 
scientific, corporate, governmental and media sources was collected and reviewed. Based on 
the results of  the literature research, relevant interview questions were developed and 
relevant interview partners were identified. 
3.2 Interviews
The main goal of  the interviews was to complement the information gained in the literature 
research regarding the legal and financial viability and to find answers to the second research 
question; investment criteria for investors in solar energy and if  the SOIS business model 
satisfies these criteria.
3.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
Newton (2010) notes that every interview type can be placed somewhere between two poles 
structured and unstructured. Highly structured interviews involve a rigid, closed 
questionnaire whereas unstructured interviews amount to a loose discussion or even just an 
observation. For this study, semi-structured interviews were carried out allowing for some 
flexibility when asking and discussing the topic but also providing some structure to ensure 
that all relevant issues were raised and collected in a systematic manner (Balkissoon, n.d.).
3.2.2 Interviews Rounds
Two rounds of  interviews were carried out. First, six experts from Switzerland and three 
experts from Portugal in the fields of  solar installations, policy, financing and legal issues 
were interviewed. The list with expert interviews can be found in annex 1. It was particularly 
important to ask practitioners because the solar industry and the policy frameworks are 
evolving rapidly and much of  the available literature is outdated very quickly. The experts 
were asked to complement and update insights from the literature research regarding the 
current costs and prices and general market conditions and regarding the legal viability of  the 
SOIS business model. This allowed the building of  the financial model that underpins the 
explanation of  the model to the potential customers with realistic figures and data. 
In a second round, in view of  answering the second research question whether the SOIS 
business model caters to the needs of  potential investors, 20 interviews with individuals from 
Switzerland that could be buyers were carried out.
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The set of  questions are briefly presented in section 3.2.4. The questions can be found in 
annexes 2, 3 and 4. 
3.2.3 Sampling and Generalisability
Sampling describes the way interviewees are chosen. Flick (2009) differentiates different 
sampling methods. Complete collection aims at interviewing the total set of  relevant people. 
This method was not feasible in this case for obvious reasons. Neither could a statistical 
representativeness be achieved for this study as this would have required several hundreds of  
interviewees. Instead, theoretical sampling was used for both interview groups. Theoretical 
sampling means selecting cases, in this case interviewees, according to specified criteria 
according to their relevancy and not according to statistical representativeness (Flick, 2009). 
For the expert interviews this criterion was obvious, they need to have an in-depth 
understanding of  the field. 
For the group of  potential investors, the goal was to find interviewees with an above-average 
interest in renewable energy investment. The reason for this goal was that uninterested 
people may not have been ready to make the mental effort to reflect about advantages and 
disadvantages. More importantly however is the reflection that such people are simply not a 
target group for the SOIS business model as required in the second research question. This 
criterion was controlled for with an introductory question about what interviewees think 
about climate change. Furthermore, 15 out of 20 interviewees chosen were between 30-40 
years old. According to Gerpott and Mahmudova (2010) younger people are more likely to 
have a positive attitude towards green electricity. At this age most people have finished 
education and only just start having a steady income. It is thus self-explanatory that younger 
people have less available income to invest in property. As a matter of fact, only 3 out of the 
20 interviewees own their current flat, less than in the average population. If interviewees are 
less likely to own houses and to be able to install solar panels on their own roofs than older 
age groups, they may be more susceptible to buy solar panels to be installed elsewhere. Also, 
chosen interviewees have an above-average educational background and are generally able to 
save money. These demographical criteria increase the likelihood of investing in renewable 
energy and considering alternatives to bank saving accounts (Ek & Söderholm, 2008; 
Hochguertel et al., 1997), see chapter 2.1.4 for more details. Further, an equal participation of 
women and men in the interviews was aimed for. 
The subsequent table 3-1 presents demographic information about the sample group.
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Table 3-1. Demographic Information About the Interview Sample Group
Source: Author
For people that corresponded with these criteria, the author used convenience sampling, 
meaning interviewing people that were available to him. Convenience sampling is suggested 
by Patton (2002) in case of limited resources in time and staff to carry out interviews.
For the expert group theoretical saturation was used as a criterion when to stop conducting 
further interviews. This means that no additional relevant data is expected to be found with 
additional interviews (Glaser, Strauss, & Strutzel, 1968). With regard to the second, bigger 
interview group of potential buyers, the author found increasingly repetitive answers and first 
signs of theoretical saturation although it is possible that more interviews would have yielded 
some more additional relevant information. Limited time availability can therefore be 
considered as a limiting factor for the generalisability of the study.
3.2.4 Interview Design
The expert interviews started with questions about the solar market situation, prices, costs, 
subsidies, market outlook, etc. This block was followed by other thematic questions on 
subsidies, legal and tax aspects. Questions were tailored to the specific expertise of the 
interviewees. Finally, experts were also asked about perceived advantages and disadvantages 
of the SOIS business model. These questions allowed to gain a broader understanding of 
how the SOIS business model may be perceived in the market and complemented insights 
from the interviews with potential buyers.
The interviews with the potential buyers proceeded in four blocks. First, questions about 
what people think about climate change and what they would be ready to do about it allowed 
to ascertain their general environmental attitudes. Second, questions about their investment 
attitudes, criteria and experiences allowed the author to address the second research question. 
Third, questions about their opinions on associations and stock market investments as well 
as their perceived advantages and disadvantages of the SOIS business model helped 
determining to what extent the SOIS business model answers their investment needs. 
Demographic categories of  interviewees  
Gender (women)
Age
20 - 30
30 - 40
40 - 50
50 - 80
Education
University or equivalent
Professional degree
Number of interviewees per category out of 20
9
2
15
3
0
16
4
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Fourth, demographic questions allowed the author to check whether the sample corresponds 
to the desired sample. Questions in the first three blocks included a mix of open questions 
where discussions were possible and closed questions where participants were asked to rank 
different options or indicate preferences in order to produce numerical indications.  
3.3 Ethical Considerations
The study was conducted independently from any organisation. Interviewees were chosen as 
outlined in chapter 3.2.3. The author takes care that the opinions of  individual interviewees 
cannot be linked to their name.
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4 Results: Case Study
In this chapter, drawing on the literature research as well as on the interviews with experts 
and potential buyers, the author elaborates upon: legal aspects, financial viability of different 
scenarios in Switzerland and in Portugal and investment criteria and attitudes of the target 
buyer group towards the SOIS business model.
4.1.1 The Small-Scale, Off-Site Investment in Solar Energy Business 
Model
The core principles of the SOIS business model are inspired by the US company Cloudsolar 
(Cloudsolar, 2015) and have already been presented in the introduction. This section presents 
the model in more detail and elaborates on the individual elements. 
The three key actors in the SOIS business model are the buyer of the solar panel, the Solar 
Service Company (SSC) and the roof-owner. They work together in the following way.
1. The client buys the panel from the SSC. The costs include a proportional share of 
other necessary items such as mounting racks, inverters, wiring, meters, etc. The 
panel and equipment price and specifications are presented in section 4.3; 
2. A long-term service contract is signed regulating the obligation of the SSC and the 
rights of panel owner;
3. The SSC undertakes to find a suitable roof to install the panel. In the two examined 
countries (Switzerland and Portugal) it is not possible to have the panels installed on 
a plot of land, refer to section 4.2 for more details; 
4. The SSC relieves the panel owners from any administrative effort, deals with all 
regulatory issues and permits and signs a contract including a power-purchase 
agreement with the roof-owner and with the utility for the sale of the excess 
electricity. These contracts guarantee the continuing use of the roof for 25 years, 
regulate insurance and liability questions and ensures that the roof owner buys a 
maximum of the electricity produced by the panels. See section 4.2 for more details 
about the need for self-consumption;
5. The SSC regularly pays out 80% of the returns from selling electricity to the panel 
owner and keeps 20% for its activities;
6. The service contract between the buyer and the SSC also foresees the possibility for 
the panel owner to take the panels down or to sell them at any time against a fee.
The process of the SOIS business is visualised in the following figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1. Representation of the Small-Scale Off-Site Investment in Solar Energy Business Model
Source: Author
Compared to other business models that allow citizens to invest in renewable energy, in the 
SOIS model, the buyer does not become a member of an association or buy stocks in the 
SSC but legally owns the solar panel. This ensures that the buyer’s investment is not lost 
should the SSC go out of business and thereby reduces the overall risk for the buyer. 
However, in such a case, significant transaction costs may occur. The fact that the buyer 
owns a share of the various system components that cannot be physically recovered is 
inherent to this business model. This constitutes an additional risk for a panel owner that 
wants to uninstall her or his panel and bring it home. However, it does not pose a financial 
risk if the panel is sold to a new owner but remains in the same location because the sale 
price includes the value for the system components. It can be expected that the second case 
is much more likely for the average panel-owner.
In the following table 4-1 the SOIS business model will be defined using the components 
presented in chapter 2.2 in table 2-1.
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Table 4-1. Business Model Components Applied to the SOIS Business Model
Source: Author
4.1 Legal Aspects
While the basic model is very straightforward – the buyers buy the panels and are thus the 
owners – reality is more complicated. Experts, including two lawyers confirm the findings 
from the literature research that the SOIS business model – guaranteeing ownership to many 
small buyers – is new in Switzerland and creates new legal challenges.
The legal experts confirm that the ownership of the panel can be regulated between the 
buyer and the SSC. However, it is more difficult to guarantee the control of the panel against 
the roof-owner. In Switzerland, installed solar panels are considered to be part of the roof 
and therefore of the building. In case the ownership of the roof changes during the contract 
period, the control over the panels may be given to the new roof owner, which may not be 
bound by a rental contract. According to the legal experts it is therefore necessary to register 
the right of the continuing use of the roof in the public land register, which requires the 
consent of the roof owner and is subject to a significant fee. For practical and financial 
reasons, it is not possible that all panel owners sign contracts with the roof-owner and obtain 
the required entry in the land register. This would also be incompatible with the goal of the 
business model to spare the buyers from any administrative time effort.
Hence the SSC needs to secure the land register entry and the contract with the roof owner. 
However, in this case, the rights are with the SSC and not with the panel owner. Should the 
SSC become insolvent, the right to continuously use the roof may also be at risk. 
While the SSC can issue certificates of ownerships to the owner, it may be not be able to 
legally guarantee the continuing operation of the panels if it should go bankrupt. In other 
Components
The Offering
The Market
Internal Capabilities
Competition
Finances
Growth
Foundational Level
The SSC creates value by selling the service of  installing, operating and 
managing solar panels for their owners. It also creates value for the roof-
owner by selling renewable electricity cheaper than current market prices 
and guarantees a stable price over 25 years. 
Customers are small savers without roof  ownership and the capital and 
time resources to invest in a solar installation themselves but with an 
interest in renewable energy generation.
The company can efficiently manage a great number of  people and panels 
and develops a network of  interested roof-owners.
Competition comes from associations and investments in stocks as well as 
a number of  emerging business models as mentioned in the introduction.
The SSC keeps a share of  the revenue of  the managed panels.
Various growth ambitions and strategies may be possible. Refer to the 
introduction for an approximate indication of  the potential market and to 
sections 4.3.3 and 5.2.6 for an analysis of  the financial viability of  the SSC.
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words, this legal issue makes the extra level of ownership protection, (compared to 
alternative business models) aimed at by the SOIS business model difficult to achieve. 
There is however a possible solution mentioned by the experts. The SSC may create a Special 
Purpose Entity (SPE) that is solely responsible for a particular project. SPE’s are created by 
one or multiple companies for a very specific purpose such as implementing a project 
(Schäfer & Kuhnle, 2006). They do not usually have other, independent activities and are 
often controlled by their owners to a great degree. However, they are usually bankruptcy remote 
meaning that its assets and operations are protected in the case of an insolvency of the 
parent company (Cohn, 1997). For the purpose of the SOIS business model, a SPE would 
sign the contract with the roof owner and the land register entry and operates the panels 
instead of the SSC. It would be legally and risk-wise separated from the SSC and could 
continue to operate independently if the SSC should become insolvent (Colman, 2013). This 
way, the buyers may be protected against a roof-owner change and a bankruptcy of the SSC 
and only be exposed to the risk related to the particular project where their panel is located. 
It is important to note that many details of this potential solution need to be worked out by 
legal experts. 
During the time available for this study, it was unfortunately not possible to discuss legal 
aspect with experts in Portugal. However, one solar installer well acquainted with the legal 
situation confirmed that the new bill has provisions that allow and support investment by 
foreign capital givers on roofs owned by another party.
4.2 Variables of the Financial Model
In this section, the numerous variables used in the different financial scenarios for 
implementing the SOIS business model in Switzerland and in Portugal are presented and 
explained. In the last subsection the results of a simulation sheds light on the revenues the 
SSC can expect by implementing the model and on its financial sustainability.
For the scenarios numerous assumptions need to be made for two main reasons. First, the 
models cannot draw on existing projects and data but deals with an uncertain future; and 
second, figures indicated by the literature and by experts differ to a significant degree. 
Assumptions involve subjective decisions and thus need to be justified. For this study, the 
author deals with this challenge by triangulating information from different sources. 
Additionally, in order to prevent over-optimistic financial scenarios, conservative figures are 
chosen from the band of possible values. For the purpose of this study, conservative figures 
mean to ensure that real world figures would unlikely be worse for the financial viability of 
the model than the ones chosen in the model for an average case.
The financial model for all four scenarios can be found in annexes 5 to 8.
4.2.1 Technical Terms
In the subsequent two sections the reader can find some indications and justifications of the 
measures used in this study. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to delve into the 
details of electricity or investment measures. The author also provides some links to 
additional information on the matter. 
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Electricity Output of a Solar Panel
The nominal power of a solar panel is commonly measured in Kilowatt Peak (kWp). It 
ensures comparability by defining exactly the ambient and radiation test conditions for solar 
panels in order to determine their output. Refer to (PVCalc, 2015) or (Solar Facts and 
Advice, 2013) for more information. 
Investment Calculation
In order to compare the different financial scenarios, the Net Present Value (NPV), the 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) are 
calculated.
The NPV indicates whether an investment has a positive return taking into account the time 
value of money, which is lower in the future according to the chosen discounting interest 
rate. A positive NPV is generally considered to be a condition for the financial viability of a 
project (Schmidt, 2015). The model assumes that the target group’s opportunity cost and 
therefore the cost of capital is very low at 1% because the alternative is to let the money sit in 
a bank saving account.
IRR is a commonly used measure indicating the interest rate that causes the NPV to equal 
zero (Phalippou, 2008). If a project features a higher IRR than another project, it indicates a 
higher potential return of that project while holding the NPV constant at zero in both cases. 
However, according to various authors, the IRR has multiple shortcomings that are 
addressed by the MIRR. Notably, the IRR assumes that the rate of return of reinvested 
receipts equals its own rate (Lamba, 2010) while the MIRR allows to specify this rate of 
return (Kierulff, 2008). For this business model, it is more realistic to assume that receipts go 
back to the panel owner’s bank saving account and thus the IRR may significantly 
overestimate the real rate of return of an investment. The trade-off is that the MIRR requires 
the analyst to specify the expected rate of return on the receipts. The higher this rate, the 
higher the long-term return of the investment. Defining the rate is tricky because long-term 
interest rates are very difficult to predict and no reliable sources have been found. Federal 
bonds yields can be used as a proxy, Swiss bonds currently yielding 0.5% over 30 years 
(Investing.com, 2015). However, their current yield underestimates interest rates on bank 
saving accounts approximately by 0.5%. Considering this, the author corrects the return rate 
by 0.5% and assumes an average return on the receipts from the solar panels of 1% over 25 
years.
Investment Costs
Investment costs refer to the solar panel prices as well as to the Balance of  System (BoS) 
costs, which include other equipment such as inverters, wires, brackets, installation 
equipment, labour for construction and planning and overhead costs of  involved companies. 
Today, panel costs Germany account for about 50% of  investment costs (Wirth and 
Schneider, 2015). Therefore, further panel price decreases have a limited effect on investment 
costs without parallel decreases of  BoS costs. 
The investment costs indicated in this study cover all of  the above items. The cost of  a panel 
as calculated in section 4.3 includes a per panel share of  BoS costs. In the case of  the panel 
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owner wishing to remove her or his panel from an installation, this constitutes a financial risk 
because a majority of  the investment value cannot be physically detached from the 
installation and may be lost. See section 4.1.1 for more information on this issue.
4.2.2 Financial Scenario Switzerland
This section presents the conditions in the Swiss solar market that determine the financial 
viability of the SOIS business model if implemented in Switzerland. Data was collected from 
industry sources, publicly available information from the Swiss government and expert 
interviews. The financial incentive structure in Switzerland is different for varying project 
sizes and the financial model developed for this study features three different scenarios in 
terms of installation dimensions. The considered sizes include 5 kWp for scenario 1, 30 kWp 
for scenario 2 and 400 kWp for scenario 3. More details can be found in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
Subsidies and the Role of Self-Consumption
Since 2008 Switzerland incentivises solar power production with a feed-in tariff (FIT) 
essentially guaranteeing a selling price to the producer for 20 years that allows him or her to 
make a profit (Couture & Gagnon, 2010; Klein et al., 2007; Mendonca et al., 2009; Ringel, 
2006). Contrary to the well known example of Germany, the Swiss FIT scheme has always 
been capped and therefore financing has not been able to keep up with a rapidly expanding 
list of applications. Much of the available funds are now tied up for financing the early 
projects and little money is left for new ones. The result is a massive waiting list of 3-4 years 
for receiving the FIT. While a recent increase in 2014 will reduce the waiting list (Bundesamt 
für Energie, 2014), all interviewed industry experts agreed that new projects must not count 
on the FIT to ensure their profitability. The FIT is financed through a levy (Swissgrid, 2015) 
on the consumer electricity bill at currently CHF 0.011 per kWh (EUR 0.0101 per kWh) and 
is adjusted in accordance to the price development of solar energy, thus rapidly decreasing 
for new installations. 
In 2015 a new instrument, the so called one-off investment grant (Einmalvergütung EIV) has 
been established. The EIV directly contributes to the investment cost of a solar energy 
installation up to the size of 30 kWp (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2014). The EIV is 30% 
up to approximately 9 kWp installations and decreases to below 25% for 30 kWp installation 
according to a formula that can be found in annex 6. There is no preferential feed-in tariff 
but the installers have the right to self-consume the electricity produced and so to save on 
their current electricity bill. There is no cap and no waiting list although it will be limited by 
the availability of funds at some point in the future (2014). 
This means that there is currently no reliable incentive scheme for installations bigger than 
30 kWp in Switzerland. As a result of the factual absence of a FIT for new installations and 
considering the information about the EIV it is clear that the financial viability of any new 
solar installation in Switzerland is closely linked to the ability of the roof-owner to self-
consume the electricity produced. Self-consumed electricity replaces electricity otherwise 
bought from the grid and thus provides much higher revenues than electricity sold into the 
grid, see next section for more information. Experts and installers estimate that a well-
managed residential house can have a self-consumption of up to 40% (Spiezsolar, 2015), 
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while bigger installations on commercial buildings can have higher rates of self-consumption 
(PV magazine Deutschland, 2012). For this study the following rates for self-consumption as 
presented in table 4-2 have been assumed:
Table 4-2. Rates of Self-Consumption in the Four Financial Scenarios for the SOIS business model
Source: Author
Production and Revenues
Multiple sources and experts indicate the average output of solar panels in Switzerland per 
year with 1 000 kWh per 1 kWp of installed capacity (Gloor, 2014; Spiezsolar, 2015) and the 
current average efficiency per panel with 16%. These figures are therefore used in the 
financial model.
The factual self-consumption requirement mentioned in the previous section excludes solar 
on-ground installations and therefore no land leasing or purchase costs is factored in the 
model. However, it is assumed that the electricity is sold to the roof-owner at a 5% discount 
relative to the price she or he currently pays for electricity from the grid. A discussion of 
benefits for roof-owners can be found in section 4.2.4. As indicated in section 4.1.1, the 
scenarios are calculated with the assumption that the SSC takes a share of 20% of effective 
panel revenues as a compensation for setting up, maintaining and operating the panels.
In regard to electricity prices, a study carried out by Prognos AG on behalf of the Swiss 
Agency for Energy expects an average price increase for consumers of 0.3% per year over 
the next 25 years (Kirchner et al., 2012). The Swiss National Bank (2015) expects negative 
inflation until 2016 and then projects slowly increasing inflation at 0.5%-1% in the following 
years. Taking into account the effects from the ongoing market liberalisation in Switzerland, 
which are difficult to predict, the financial model conservatively assumes an annual average 
0.5% increase for electricity prices and inflation combined over the next 25 years. 
Projects without the FIT can self-consume produced electricity and sell excess electricity into 
the grid at utility-defined prices. The value of self-consumed electricity is equivalent to the 
price of electricity bought from the grid. Switzerland does not have a liberalised electricity 
market for small and medium consumers and prices fluctuate between the regions and the 
quantity of electricity procured. For small installations in scenario 1 and 2, the value of self-
consumption was calculated using the end-consumer prices in the Canton of Berne, which is 
CHF 0.23 per kWh (EUR 0.21 per kWh) (Eidgenössische Elektrizitätskommission, 2015). 
For scenario 3 prices for a medium sized company in the canton of Berne was used at CHF 
0.177 per kWh (EUR 0.163 per kWh) (2015).
Nominal system sizes for the four financial scenarios 
5 kWp
30 kWp
400 kWp (Switzerland and Portugal)
Rate of self-consumption
35%
80%
80%
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The price for selling excess electricity to the grid varies between regions. For this study, the 
currently valid prices for the canton of Berne, which are CHF 0.107 per kWh (EUR 0.1 per 
kWh) for scenario 1 and 2 and CHF 0.059 per kWh (EUR 0.05 per kWh) for scenario 3 have 
been assumed (Bernische Kraftwerke, 2015).
Gross revenues for the scenarios are calculated using the Modified Internal Rate of Return 
(MIRR). According to Schmidt (2015), the MIRR equals the compound rate the original 
investment would have needed to earn in a bank account in order to match the rate of return 
of the project in question. In other words, compounding the investment costs with the 
MIRR outputs the gross revenue of a project over a given period of time including 
reinvestment of receipts as explained in section 4.2.1. 
Project Costs
The Decree on energy publishes reference prices for investment costs (see section 4.2.1) for 
solar installations of different dimensions in Switzerland (Energieverordnung, 2015). 
However, according to experts, these prices are considered to be best case scenarios and not 
average market prices. Therefore, the average of the prices indicated by the experts will be 
used for the three scenarios as presented in the following table 4-3. It is important to point 
out that these prices depend very much on the characteristics of each location and can differ 
significantly from project to project.
Table 4-3. Investment Costs per kWp in the Three Swiss Financial Scenarios for the SOIS business model
Source: Author
Private house owners can deduct investments in solar panels from their taxable income, 
which depending on the income can result in a net reduction of investment costs of 
15%-25% (Spiezsolar, 2015). However, according to interviewed industry experts, buyers of 
panels according to the SOIS model are not be able to deduct their purchase from income 
taxes because they are not investing into their property. This cost reduction has thus not 
been included in the financial model.
Solar Panel Maintenance and Degradation
Experts indicate that solar PV installations have annual maintenance requirements of 1% of 
the investment costs. This amount has been considered for the financial model. 
In a report analysing several studies providing 2000 data points over 40 years, Jordan and 
Kurz (2013) find that the annual median degradation of solar panels is about 0.5%. 
Degradation means the output is reduced by this amount compared to the preceding year. 
Nominal system sizes for the three Swiss 
financial scenarios
5 kWp
30 kWp
400 kWp
Investment costs per watt peak
CHF 3 (EUR 2.8)
CHF 2.5 (EUR 2.3)
CHF 1.8 (EUR 1.7)
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According to the same authors, real degradation rates may be distorted for two reasons. First, 
some underperforming panels with above average degradation rates may have been replaced 
in the examined samples leading to an underestimation of degradation and failure rate. 
Second, compensating for this distorting effect, current panels have reduced degradation 
rates. According to Roe (2012), the industry standard is to guarantee 90% output after 10 
years and 80% output after 25 years. This means that the industry is certain that average 
degradation rate is lower than 0.8% per year. The same author suggests that 2% degradation 
in the first year and then 0.5% per year should be expected. For this study, a degradation rate 
of 0.65% per year is assumed.
4.2.3 Financial Scenario Portugal
In this section, the financial scenario for a 400 kWp project in Portugal is presented.
Subsidies and the Role of Self-Consumption
Following the new bill DL 153/2014 (Ministerio do Ambiente, Ordenamento do Território e 
Energia, 2014) that entered into force on 2015-01-01 (ICF Consulting Limited, 2015), 
Portugal has now two different schemes for the production of solar energy. 
The UPAC (unidades de autoconsumo, units of self-consumption) scheme allows consumers 
to install solar panels, to self-consume produced electricity and to sell excess electricity into 
the grid at 90% of current spot market prices. There are no subsidies involved in this 
scheme. Systems cannot exceed the contracted amount of electricity of a consumer but there 
is no size or production cap on the national level (Associação Portuguesa de Empresas do 
Sector Fotovoltaico, 2015a). Different permits and fees apply for different system sizes. The 
400 kWp installation size assumed in this scenario triggers an installation tax of EUR 750 
(Associação Portuguesa de Empresas do Sector Fotovoltaico, 2015b). There is an additional 
compensation tax that applies for UPAC-C and UPAC-D6 installations as soon as combined 
UPAC installations exceed one percent of national grid capacities (2015b). When this 
happens, UPAC-C and UPAC-D installations need to pay 30% of the so called Costs of 
General Economic Interests (Custos de Interesse Economico Geral: CIEG) according to 
their installed power. The CIEG is basically all costs not related to the production of 
electricity and the grid. As soon as a level of three percent is reached, 50% of the CIEG 
needs to be paid as a compensation per installed kWp. The CIEG varies between 20% for 
industrial consumers and 30% for domestic consumers of the total price of electricity. 
According to this analysis, this compensation may significantly reduce profitability 
particularly for medium and large project over the long term (Ministerio do Ambiente, 
Ordenamento do Território e Energia, 2014). However, according to the interviewed experts 
it is not currently a main concern of installers because the installed solar energy capacity is 
well below 1% of total installed capacity. 
The UPP (unidade de pequena produção) scheme allows to produce and sell electricity into 
the grid for a tariff based on a reference price and a bidding system. As with the UPAC 
scheme, UPP systems cannot exceed the contracted amount of electricity of a consumer. 
Contrary to the UPAC system, there are two caps. The maximum connection power is 
6 Installation sizes greater than 1.5 kW.
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capped at 250 kWp and the national annual installation volume is capped at 20 MWp (2014). 
Because of the uncertainty associated with these caps and because of a generally higher 
profitability of the UPAC scheme (Associação Portuguesa de Empresas do Sector 
Fotovoltaico, 2015b), this study focuses on the UPAC scheme.   
As in the Swiss scenarios, self-consumption is very important for the UPAC scheme to be 
profitable. According to interviewed Portuguese experts, UPAC projects will generally be 
sized to guarantee a very high rate of self-consumption. Therefore, for the financial model 
developed in this study, a rate of self-consumption of 80% is assumed.
Production and Revenues
The average solar insulation in Portugal is at least 1 500 kWh per m2 (Solargis, 2015). 
Assuming a 16% efficiency and a standard size of 1.62 m2, an average panel can produce 
about 390 kWh per year.
As in the Swiss case, the financial model includes a 5% discount for electricity sold to the 
roof owner and a 20% share of net revenues for the SSC. See section 4.2.4 for more details.
The photovoltaic association predicts that electricity prices will annually increase by 3% in 
Portugal (Associação Portuguesa de Empresas do Sector Fotovoltaico, 2015b), which 
corresponds to past developments. However, the interviewed experts highlighted the 
unpredictability of prices and recommend to be cautious about factoring in high price 
increases. This view is confirmed by a report from the PV Parity Project (2012), which 
compares the electricity price projections from the EU, Greenpeace, the International 
Energy Agency and the European Photovoltaic Industry Association. Basically, the report 
finds that electricity prices are likely to increase up until 2030 and may then stabilise or even 
decrease. However, all analyses agree that prices in 2050 will be higher than today (2012). 
The long-term inflation target of the European Central Bank is below but close to 2% but 
inflation has been lower for several years now (European Central Bank, 2015). It is expected 
to rise to 1.5% in the next few years (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2015). Therefore, favouring 
a conservative approach, the model assumes 1% annual rise of electricity prices and 1% 
inflation. 
In Portugal, the value of unpurchased electricity due to self-consumption is much higher 
than the benefit from selling electricity into the grid. Portugal has a liberalised electricity 
market and consumers can freely change their electricity providers. Therefore, according to 
experts, prices paid by consumers vary significantly according to their negotiation power and 
skills. At the upper end are private households that don’t usually shop around for better 
prices and pay around EUR 0.22 per kWh. Estimations of experts in regard to electricity 
prices paid by businesses differ significantly ranging from EUR 0.09 to EUR 0.16. The 
financial model assumes average electricity prices of EUR 0.12. Prices for UPAC excess 
production sold on the common Iberian electricity exchange on the other hand are well 
known. They fluctuate around EUR 0.05 (OMIP, 2015) and sellers receive 90% of that. The 
model sets the price for excess electricity to EUR 0.04 per kWh.
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Project Costs
System prices in Portugal are significantly lower than in Switzerland. One expert indicated a 
price of EUR 1 per Wp installed capacity for solar parks bigger than 100 kWp. Another 
expert agreed in principle but specified that administrative costs may increase the price to 1.5 
EUR per kWp. The model assumes a price of 1.3 EUR per kWp.
Solar Panel Maintenance and Degradation
Portuguese industry experts concur with Swiss experts that 1% of the project costs need to 
be set aside for maintenance annually. In regards to solar panel degradation the same value as 
in the Swiss case (0.65% of output per year) is assumed.
4.2.4 Interests of the Roof-Owner
It was not possible to inquire with roof-owners about necessary incentives for accepting 
solar panels on their roofs. However, Roselund (2015) as well as a Portuguese expert 
mentioned that companies may be interested not only in discounted prices but also in 
guaranteed long-term price stability and reputation benefits that the SOIS and the fact that 
renewable electricity is used may be able to offer.
It is assumed that roof-owners receive a discount on self-consumed electricity of 5% 
compared to the price they would pay to the utility for purchasing the same amount of 
electricity. This results in the following income per panel
Table 4-4. Yearly Income for Roof-Owners in the Four Financial Scenarios for the SOIS business model
Source: Author, Solarcontact (2015) and Sonnenenergie (2011) 
No prices for Switzerland or Portugal have been found but a typical long-term rental fee for 
a roof in Germany is about 5% of the yearly revenues of the solar panels (Solarcontact, 2015; 
Sonnenenergie, 2011), which corresponds approximately to the assumed 5% discount on the 
electricity price for the roof-owner with the exception of the 5 kWp Swiss scenario. 
Scenarios
5 kWp
30 kWp
400 kWp Switzerland
400 kWp Portugal
Yearly income in EUR for roof-owner 
according to SOIS business model
per project
19.29
253
2 506
2 881
per panel
0.97
2.21
1.64
1.87
Yearly income in EUR for roof-
owner per panel according to 
standard German rent rates
per panel
1.74
2.35
1.67
1.93
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4.3 Results of the Financial Model
Results from the model with above listed assumptions and variables indicate that the SOIS 
model may be financially viable in Switzerland in some cases but that it is much more 
financially interesting to install solar panels in Portugal.
4.3.1 Results for the Four Financial Scenarios
Table 4-5 shows the results for the four scenarios. For easy comparison, CHF in scenario 1-3 
have been converted to EUR.
Table 4-5. Results of the Four Financial Scenarios for the SOIS business model
Source: Author calculations
Results of the Four Financial Scenarios 
for on the SOIS business model
System properties
Number of solar panels
Nominal Power of one solar panel
Level of self-consumption
System production per year
Production per panel per year
System Information
Investment costs after subsidies and taxes
Gross system revenue (including 
reinvestment of receipts) over 25 years
Net system revenue (including 
reinvestment of receipts) over 25 years
Panel Specific Information
Buying price / investment cost per panel
Gross revenue per panel over 25 years
Net revenue per panel over 25 years
Gross revenue for owner per panel per year
Investment Information
Payback time (including reinvestment of 
receipts)
Internal Rate of Return
Modified Internal Rate of Return
Net Present Value
Information for roof-owner
Income for roof-owner per panel per year
Scenario 1
Switzerland 
5 kWp
20
260 Wp
35%
5 200 kWh
260 kWh
€10 048 
€12 113 
€2 068
€5046
€658
€112
€26
20.8 years
0.5%
0.75%
€-604 
€0.97
Scenario 2
Switzerland 
30 kWp
115
260 Wp
80%
29 900 kWh
260 kWh
€53 739 
€104 068 
€50 262
€507
€982
€474 
€39
13.1 years
4.68%
2.67%
€27 340 
€2.21
Scenario 3 
Switzerland 
400 kWp
1 539
260 Wp
80%
400 140 kWh
260 kWh
€662 722 
€1 004 587 
€340 931
€468
€708
€240
€28
16.6 years
2.4%
1.67%
€119 668 
€1.63
Scenario 4 
Portugal   
400 kWp
1 539
260 Wp
80%
600 210 kWh
390 kWh
€520 932 
€1 480 351 
€959 419
€338 
€961 
€623 
€39 
8.9 years
8.3%
4.3%
€633 399 
€1.87
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Reinvestment of receipts refers to the fact that with the SOIS business, the panel owners 
regularly receive receipts from the sale of electricity of their panels. These receipts are then 
reinvested somewhere. In this financial model, it is assumed that receipts are put in a bank 
saving account at an interest rate of 1%. See section 4.2.1 for more information on this 
interest rate. For a discussion of these results see chapter 5.2.
4.3.2 Robustness Analysis
While in the preceding section, the most likely assumptions have been chosen, this section 
provides an analysis of  the robustness of  single parameters. Parameters that greatly influence 
financial viability are changed allowing to determine their impact on profitability while all 
other parameters are held constant. By doing that, the robustness test allows to identify the 
most relevant parameters for the standard financial model and the parameters that involve 
the greatest financial risk. Using the Modified Internal Rate of  Return ensures comparability 
between different calculations. Table 4-6 present potential negative impacts from worse than 
expected parameters.
Table 4-6. Robustness Analysis of  Four Financial Scenarios With Worse Than Expected Parameters
Source: Author’s Calculations
In the Swiss context, higher investment costs are the biggest financial risk for panel owners. 
Also, lower initial electricity prices severely restrict the financial viability of  the SOIS 
business model. Given the higher initial MIRR, the Portuguese scenario is generally much 
more robust. The biggest risks are higher investment costs and an annual decrease of  the 
electricity price. The proposed compensation tax in the Portuguese scenario reduces return 
by 0.4% once the lower threshold is passed and by by 0.69% once the higher threshold is 
passed. It is interesting to note that even a much higher compensation of  the roof-owner 
Robustness Test 
Modified Internal Rate of Return 
(MIRR) for Panel owner 
Standard financial model prediction
-0.5% annual decrease of price of electricity 
20% lower electricity baseline price
20% higher investment costs / lower panel 
output
20% lower self-consumption
Costs of General Economic Interests 
(CIEG) of 30%
Costs of General Economic Interests 
(CIEG) of 50%
50% higher discount for roof-owner
10% higher share for SSC
MIRR 
Scenario 1
Switzerland
5 kWp
0.75%
0.12%
0.14%
negative
0.33%
-
-
0.61%
0.21%
MIRR 
Scenario 2
Switzerland 
30 kWp
2.67%
2.09%
1.68%
0.35%
2.09%
-
-
2.45%
2.13%
MIRR 
Scenario 3
Switzerland 
400kWp
1.67%
1.1%
0.66%
negative
0.94%
-
-
1.44%
1.13%
MIRR 
Scenario 4 
Portugal 
400kWp
4.27%
2.85%
3.29%
2.42%
3.54%
3.87%
3.58%
4.04%
3.71%
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being one of  the biggest financial uncertainties of  the developed financial model has a 
relatively weak negative impact. 
In Table 4-7 results for better than expected parameters and their impacts on the financial 
model are presented. 
Table 4-7. Robustness Analysis of  Four Financial Scenarios With Better Than Expected Parameters
Source: Author’s Calculations
In Portugal faster than expected increasing electricity prices significantly improve financial 
return of  the SOIS business model. Lower than expected investment costs have the biggest 
potential to improve the financial viability of  the SOIS business model in Switzerland. Again, 
the compensation to the roof-owner has the lowest influence.
The robustness test also controlled for different shares of  revenues for the SSC. A 30% 
share reduces the MIRR by about 0.5% in all scenarios, leading to very low values (0.21% - 
2.13%) for the Swiss scenarios. In the Portuguese case, such a strategy leads to a MIRR of  
3.71%. The robustness of the financial model is discussed in section 5.2.5.
4.3.3 Financial Viability for the Solar Service Company
It is important to note that the SOIS business model not only needs to provide a satisfying 
financial return to buyers of  the solar panels but also to the SSC. Only a financially 
sustainable company can reliably offer the services customers rely upon, namely continue 
operating the panel, deal with the roof-owner, sell electricity and buy back the panels if  need 
be. Therefore, this section provides the results of  a simple financial simulation indicating the 
revenues the SSC can expect from implementing the SOIS model. 
In the small installation Swiss scenario, income for the SSC per panel and per year is only 
CHF 5.8 (EUR 5.3). Therefore, the 20 panels installed in this scenario would net a mere 
CHF 145 (EUR 133) per year. This amounts to approximately four paid hours for an 
Robustness Test 
Modified Internal Rate of 
Return (MIRR) for Panel owner 
Standard financial model 
prediction
2% annual increase of price of 
electricity 
4% in Portugal
20% lower investment costs / 
higher panel performance
10% higher self-consumption
No discount for roof-owner
10% lower share for Solar Service 
Company
MIRR
Scenario 1
Switzerland
5 kWp
0.75%
1.71%
1.87%
1.13%
0.89%
1.23%
MIRR 
Scenario 2
Switzerland 
30 kWp
2.67%
3.57%
4.02%
2.94%
2.89%
3.16%
MIRR 
Scenario 3
Switzerland 
400kWp
1.67%
2.56%
2.7%
2%
1.89%
2.15%
MIRR 
Scenario 4 
Portugal 
400kWp
4.27%
5.47%
5.27%
4.59%
4.48%
4.76%
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employee in Switzerland to deal with the management of the installation and communicate 
with 20 customers. 
A more detailed simulation uses figures and assumptions from the most financially 
interesting scenario, in which the solar panels are installed in Portugal.
Assuming that the SSC has a slow start installing one project at the end of  the first year of  
existence, two projects in the second and then four projects through the fifth year. Such a 
development would result in the SSC managing about 21 400 panels, 15 locations (including 
potentially 15 SPEs) and 10 000 customers after five years. According to the financial 
scenario for Portugal for a 400 kWp project, the SSC’s 20% share equals EUR 13 200 per 
project and per year and so, the SSC may have an income of 178 200 EUR after five years.
In terms of expenses, no detailed modelling has been carried out in this study. Nevertheless, 
assuming a startup scenario with a very small SSC, it can be assumed that overhead costs are 
relatively low at around 10% of revenue and marketing expenses are around 10% of revenue 
(Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft: KMU-Portal, 2012). The SSC also needs to make 
significant initial investments in expertise regarding legal and contractual matters as well as 
regarding a suitable software platform. However, the biggest expense for a service oriented 
company is salaries.  Swiss annual average gross wage is around EUR 79 000 (OECD, 2015) 
not including the company’s share of 17% social security costs (Handelskammer 
Deutschland - Schweiz, 2010). Even if the SSC may be able to employ staff at lower wages, 
(unofficial) minimal salaries levels in Switzerland are significant, the biggest Swiss retailer 
paying a minimal gross salary of EUR 48 000 (Migros, 2014). The minimum capital to 
register a limited liability company in Switzerland is CHF 20 000 (EUR 18 500) 
(Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft: KMU Portal, n.d.), so this is assumed to be the starting 
capital. All these assumptions lead to the following hypothetical financial model for the SSC 
as presented in Table 4-7.
Table 4-7. Scenario for the Financial Viability of the Solar Service Company
Source: Author
Business Years
Starting Capital
1. year: 1 project
2. Year: 3 (1+2) 
projects
3. Year: 7 (3+4) 
projects
4. Year: 11 (7 + 4) 
projects
5. Year 15 (11 + 4) 
projects
Revenue SSC 
in EUR per 
year
3 300
26 404
72 611
125 419
178 227
Expenses SSC in EUR per year
Salaries
4 000
12 000
43 000
87 000
125 000
Marketing
3 000
4 000
6 000
12 000
18 000
Expertise
12 000
8 000
12 000
12 000
16 000
Overhead
2 000
3 000
8 000
12 000
16 000
Capital
in EUR
18 500
800
204
3 815
6 234
9 461
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The discussion of the simulation and of the figures can be found in section 5.2.6.
4.4 Characteristics and Attitudes of the Target Buyer Group
In the following sections, available information regarding the size, the investment attitudes 
and interest of the target customer group of the SOIS business model will be presented. 
Information is based on 20 interviews conducted by the author in July and August 2015 in 
Switzerland and complemented with insights from the literature.  
4.4.1 Target Group Size
In the introduction, it was established that Swiss citizens are able to save CHF 1 329 per year 
on average with people with a regular salary probably significantly exceeding this amount. 
Taking into account this information and considering the relatively low price for a panel of 
CHF 400 to CHF 500 (EUR 370 to EUR 460) it is safe to assume that there are enough 
people with sufficient purchasing /saving power in Switzerland for the SOIS business model 
to take off.
Switzerland features one of the highest rate of people who rent the apartments they live in. 
While the rate of house-owners is slowly increasing, in 2012 only 37% of the population 
owned their flats or houses. Together with Germany this is the lowest rate in Europe 
(Eurostat, 2015a). This means that a big majority of Swiss do not have the opportunity to 
decide whether or not to install solar panels on the roofs of the buildings they live in. Also, 
many of the people that own a flat do not have a suitable roof for installing solar panels. 
It can be concluded that there is a significant potential target group of people with enough 
capital and without a possibility to install solar panels on their roofs.
4.4.2 Environmental Awareness
In order to determine interviewees general environmental awareness, they were asked 
whether they consider climate change to be a relevant issue. All interviewees agreed that 
climate change is happening and is a serious challenge and only one doubted about the 
human involvement in climate change. When asked about what measures they would 
personally be willing to take, driving a smaller or no car received highest marks among the 
interviewed people. Most would also be willing to pay higher energy prices and invest in 
renewable energy. However, eating less meat and flying less seem to be the hardest options. 
4.4.3 Interest in Sustainable Investments
Regarding the size of the sustainable investment market, a financial expert working in this 
field stated that he considers this market segment a large and rapidly growing niche. 
In the sample group, 17 interviewees stated that they would be interested in buying solar 
panels, a much higher rate than the 9 persons declaring that environmental protection is a 
motivation when deciding about investments. This confirms the notion from chapter 2.1 that 
interest and trust in a technology may be important drivers for such buying decisions.
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4.4.4 Saving and Investment Behaviour
From the interviews some interesting conclusions can be drawn. 13 out of 20 interviewees 
expressed some degree of dissatisfaction with current returns on their savings, the others 
either did not know or did not care much about returns. Pretty much in line with these 
findings, 11 have been looking into alternatives to bank saving accounts. However, it seems 
to be difficult for the interviewees to identify suitable alternatives. In order to simplify things, 
two broad alternatives were presented to the interviewees. Investment in stock markets and 
membership including investments in associations. 
In regard to stock markets, most recognised that they may offer more return than bank 
saving accounts but 8 out of 20 indicate that they do not accept the additional risk they 
associate with stocks. Several have also made negative experiences themselves or they know 
others that have lost money with investments in stocks. Other worries include excessive time 
requirements to make informed stock market investment decision and reluctance to 
participate in a little understood market that some interviewees felt is delinked from the real, 
economy and human needs, potentially contributing to repeating economic crisis. Only three 
persons do not express explicit negative feelings although many of the eleven that are 
looking for alternatives to bank saving accounts consider or have considered to invest in the 
stock market.
In regard to investing in associations, the picture is quite different. 9 view them in a positive 
way and like that they contribute to community development. However, a clear majority 
declared that they consider such schemes and the participation possibilities they offer or 
require to be potentially too time consuming.
Asked to rank a list of possible criteria for general investment decisions, interviewees equally 
preferred little risk and little personal time investment. Therefore, in table 4.8 the two criteria 
as first choices and then high financial return as the third choice, followed by social and 
environmental benefit are displayed. Multiple participants further mentioned transparency, 
innovation, long-term thinking and trust into the financial partner as additional criteria for an 
investment decision. One person with a particularly strong reluctance to invest time 
mentioned that she would only invest if the opportunity was good and big enough to make a 
relevant difference to her personal finances.
Table 4-8. Interviewees’ Priorities for Investment Decisions
Source: Author based on interviews
All questions related to investing specifically into renewable energy ranked significantly 
lower. Reduction of dependence on foreign energy suppliers ranked highest, trailed by 
knowing people who can recommend it, the possibility to physically consume renewable 
Rank
1
1
3
4
General Priorities for Investment Decisions
Little risk
Little personal time investment 
High financial return
Social and environmental benefits
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energy and lastly the possibility to demonstrate green mindedness. From these results it is 
clear that such renewable specific criteria are not very relevant to people. This confirms their 
statements that environmental benefit is not very important for general investment decisions.
4.4.5 Attitudes Towards Solar Energy
Most interviewees state that they do not know much about solar PV. Three out of 20 have a 
good understanding of the political aspects of the solar market and claim to have a good 
technical understanding because they have already or are in the process of installing solar 
panels on their own roofs. Three people are concerned that solar panels may have important 
negative environmental impacts and a long energy payback time. The average number (on a 
scale of 1-5, 5 being the highest value) regarding the knowledge was 2.8. However, it is 
interesting to note that even without much knowledge, participants state that they have a 
positive attitude towards solar energy, the average rate being 4 out of 5. Solar energy is linked 
to innovation, progress and seen as a future proof and helpful technology to deal with energy 
challenges and climate change. Two interviewees are concerned about aesthetical issues of 
solar panels in regard to valuable architecture and city landscapes. A clear majority is pleased 
that the SOIS business model does not rely on long-term subsidies but most of these 
interviewees also state that they would not mind if this was the case. Overall, despite some 
worries, the sample group has a clearly positive attitude towards solar energy and it is not 
surprising that 18 would consider investing in solar energy.
4.4.6 View on Proposed Business Model
As a preparation, the author presented a simple visualisation of the SOIS business model to 
the interviewees and used the ensuing short discussion to ensure a proper understanding of 
the basic principles. Additionally, interviewees were given estimations of the financial return 
based on the results of the financial models as displayed in table 4-5. 
Asked about their views on advantages and disadvantages of the SOIS business model, 
interviewees shared the following interesting perspectives.
Advantages and Disadvantages
In the following two tables 4-9 and 4-10, the most important advantages and disadvantages, 
interviewees associate with the SOIS business model are presented. The figures in the second 
column represents how many people out of 20 have mentioned that particular advantage or 
disadvantage in the discussion.
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Table 4-9. Perceived Advantages of SOIS Business Model
Source: Author, based on interviews
Interviewees rank environmental benefit of the SOIS business model higher than they do in 
regard for their general investment preferences. This will be discussed in section 5.5. As 
expected, they value the combination of simplicity and concreteness (in the sense that they 
want to know where their money is going), little time investment, little risk including the 
possibility to invest small amounts of money, innovativeness and a higher return than on 
their bank saving account. In their eyes, the combination of these factors offered by the 
SOIS business model offers an advantage compared to the two mentioned alternatives, 
associations and stock markets. 
Perceived Advantages of  SOIS Business Model
Environment benefit
Simple and concrete
Requires little time and knowledge 
Little risk
Innovative model
Can invest small amounts
Financial benefits
Transparency
Control and ownership
Increases awareness for electricity transition
Long-term perspective
Crosses borders
Number of  interviewees (out of  20) mentioning 
an advantage of  the SOIS business model
8
7
6
6
6
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
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Table 4-10. Perceived Disadvantages of SOIS Business Model
Source: Author, based on interviews
It is obvious that worry about the stability and sustainability of the Solar Service Company is 
a major issue. Interviewees mention that such a new company has not yet proven itself and 
may have a difficult time earning the trust required to gain customers. Related to that is the 
worry that the company may have difficulties to scale up its business in such a way that it can 
generate enough revenue for itself and become financially sustainable in the long-term.
Interestingly, the fact that the SOIS business model requires a long-term perspective is 
perceived both as an advantage and as a disadvantage. Furthermore, it is clear that even 
interviewees that do not mention it explicitly as a disadvantage would like to have a 
guaranteed and attractive exit option. Linked to that issue is the worry of technical 
obsolescence of purchased solar panels.
Three interviewees correctly identified changing electricity prices as one of the major 
operational risk for the financial viability of the investment.
Generally, interviewees raised few disadvantages, only 31 entries compared to 55 entries for 
advantages. 
Perceived Disadvantages of SOIS Business Model
Doubts about stability and financial viability of  the SSC
Long-term perspective
Doubts about stable or rising electricity prices
Doubts about scaling possibility and financial return for 
investors
Worries about exit possibility
Risk to put panels abroad
Worries that technological progress reduces the value of  
their panels
Doubts about guarantees for construction work, 
installation and equipment other than solar panel
Doubt about legal ownership protection
Doubt about enough available roofs in Switzerland
Too small financial impact to be worth the time
Cannot use output themselves
Responsibility to own panel
Number of  interviewees mentioning a 
disadvantage of  the SOIS business model
8
4
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Role of Ownership
In regard to the feature of the SOIS model to own a panel, four people stated that while they 
would like it, they do not consider this to be important. Six interviewees stated that this 
feature would make them feel good and three stated that it would make them feel even great. 
One person noted that she would perceive ownership more as a burden and a responsibility 
she would not like to have. Several people have no particular opinion about it, likely because 
the model, although explained and discussed remains too abstract.
Exit Possibility
In the explanation of the of SOIS business model prior to the interview, it was highlighted 
that the SSC may guarantee to offer to buy back panels from owners still allowing them to 
make a profit. In the discussion of the semi-structured interview many interviewees have 
indicated that they consider 25 years to be a rather long contract period and that this 
possibility would be very important to them. 
View on Scenarios with Different Locations of the Solar Panel
All but one interviewee would consider having their panel installed in another country such 
as Portugal. Interviewees liked the additional social, development and financial benefits but 
some pointed out that they would prefer to be able to choose where their solar panel would 
be located. Reasons given include the wish to use solar power themselves, providing benefits 
to the local industry and the notion that Switzerland should realise its solar potential much 
better. 
Interviewees feel that installing their panels abroad increases overall project risks and require 
more trust to the SSC and the need for better information about the project prior to 
investment. Some also mentioned the wish to see the SOIS business model work in 
demonstration projects before buying solar panels themselves.
In regard to the country their solar panels might be installed in, interviewees have no 
preference. In their view, southern European countries all trigger more risk than Switzerland 
and provide similar benefits.
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5 Discussion
In this chapter, the results from the case study will be analysed, the pertinence of the theory 
and of the conceptual framework will be discussed and limitations will be presented. 
5.1 Interpretation of Legal Viability
Regarding the legal viability, important challenges have been brought up in the case study in 
section 4.1 that may require some adjustments to the SOIS business model. Specifically, it 
may be difficult to guarantee the continuing operation of the panel in the case the SSC goes 
bankrupt because it owns the right to put the panels on the roof of a third party. A special 
purpose entity (SPE) has been suggested as a possible solution to this.
Now, what are the implications of this issue? Even though buyers may not be able to have 
the legal title to put their panels on a particular roof, they still own them. The mentioned 
issue may be a legal challenge but not so much a problem for the buyers from the 
psychological point of view. Indeed, as noted in the case study only just over half of the 
interviewees believe that owning the panels reduce the business risk. They correctly assume 
that even if the panel owners keep on to their panels, a bankruptcy of the SSC would inflict 
significant transaction costs on them if they want their panels to continue to operate. 
However, this risk does not prevent them from being interested in the model, they just don’t 
see ownership as a significant advantage in terms of risk. What does matter to most people in 
terms of ownership, is the possibility to sell the panels. The SSC is well advised to guarantee 
that possibility in the service contract with the buyers.
As highlighted in several interviews, it comes down to the question if potential buyers trust 
the sustainability of the SSC. Without trust, people will not buy the panels, particularly not if 
they are located in another country. With trust, they may also be willing to rely on the SSC 
for access to a roof for their panels and they may accept the risk of transaction costs should 
the SSC become insolvent. Ownership for the buyers would then be limited to legal control, 
the right to sell them and to receive receipts.
As suggested by legal experts, the company may decide to create a project specific SPE that 
handles the contract with the roof owner and other local project partners. It was not possible 
for this study to follow up in detail on this legal construction. However, discussing the idea 
with two lawyers, it appears that a SPE may alleviate the above-mentioned challenge in some 
important aspects. While it does not fundamentally change the rights of the panel owner it 
nevertheless adds a layer of security by isolating the project from the fortunes of the SSC and 
ensures that the project can continue to run even if the SSC should become insolvent. If 
these advantages materialise, SPE may become a central part of the SOIS business model.
It was unfortunately not possible to talk to Portuguese lawyers but the author suspects that 
that legal challenges brought up in this study may be similar in Portugal.
Also related to legal viability are regulatory risks to the SOIS business model. It may be 
surprising that such risks have not been identified as major challenges by experts nor in the 
literature. Reasons may include the fact that the model does not rely on long-term subsidies 
and that the current shift in Europe to a policy framework encouraging self-consumption 
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seems to be very broad and stable and does not impose costs on the state making it more 
unlikely to be reversed. Also, both Switzerland and Portugal are early solar energy markets 
and the discussion of costs and benefits of solar energy to the electricity system may only 
emerge at increasing total installed solar generation capacity as has been the case in the more 
mature markets in Germany or in the USA. That being said grid-related regulatory costs can 
constitutes a long-term risk might have been underestimated by the interviewed experts 
looking at shorter time spans. 
5.2 Interpretation of Financial Viability
Four different scenarios have been presented in chapter 4.2. and will be discussed in this 
section. In short, the SOIS model can be financially viable. However, this does not apply to 
all scenarios and depends on the assumptions chosen.
Conservative assumptions notably for solar radiation, the rate of self-consumption, 
investment costs, future electricity prices, returns on reinvestment of receipts and inflation 
contribute to making the interpretation of the results reliable and help avoiding an 
overestimation of the financial viability. It is possible that real bottom-line figures would be 
better than the ones assumed and analysed here.
5.2.1 Small Scenario Switzerland
The first scenario for small installations in Switzerland is not financially viable for the buyer 
given current financial incentives. The model indicates a net revenue of CHF 112 
( EUR 103) for an investment of CHF 546 (EUR 505) equalling 0.8% return (indicated as 
Modified Internal Rate of Return MIRR, see section 4.2.1) over 25 years. Looking at the 
model, the main reason for this outcome is the low self-consumption for small installations 
that are most likely located on residential houses and the relative high investment costs per 
panel. The 30% subsidy cannot make up for these two disadvantages. Another critical issue 
with the small installations scenario is lacking financial viability for the SSC. See section 5.2.6 
for a discussion of this issue. 
Given the very low return, the model has also been calculated with no SSC or roof-owner 
each taking their share and the buyer taking 100% of revenue. This was done in order to 
check for the validity of the financial model. Many people are investing at apparently 
satisfying returns and the financial model should be able to explain that in order to be valid. 
It turns out that after removing SSC and roof owner from the model, the financial return 
expressed as MIRR is still quite low at annually 1.78% over 25 years. However after adding 
the 15% tax reduction discussed in section 4.2.2, the model becomes more interesting and 
earns a MIRR of 2.8% and an IRR of 5%. Therefore, private house owners with suitable 
roofs should not invest in the SOIS model but rather invest themselves, strive for a high self-
consumption and not forget to claim the tax deduction in order to make a decent profit. This 
simulation also suggests that the developed financial model is valid.
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5.2.2 Medium Scenario Switzerland
Despite the reduced one-off investment grant from 30% to 21.8%, this (30 kWp) scenario is 
financially viable. CHF 474 (EUR 436) net revenue over 25 years translates to a MIRR of 
2.67% and a clearly positive NPV. This return is significantly higher than on today’s bank 
saving accounts in Switzerland. Therefore, this scenario might be acceptable for buyers 
whose alternative is to let their money on savings accounts and who value local and 
environmentally friendly investments. 
The reasons for the significant improvement over the small installation scenario are the 
cheaper system prices but above all a much higher self-consumption rate. The medium sized 
installation is assumed to be located on a commercial roof whose owner is consuming most 
electricity during daytime and hence is able to self-consume 80% of the electricity production 
of the panels. 
5.2.3 Large Scenario Switzerland
In the large installation size scenario (400 kWp), there is no subsidy available and 
consequently the financial viability suffers. Panels in this scenario earn CHF 240 (EUR 220) 
over 25 years equalling a MIRR of 1.67% meaning it is less profitable than scenario 2 but 
more profitable than scenario 1. In this scenario, due to the bigger project size, panels are 
significantly cheaper at CHF 468 (EUR 433) compared to the small installation size scenario 
at CHF 546 (EUR 506). On the other hand, electricity prices for medium sized companies 
and thus the value of the produced electricity is lower. Therefore, without the subsidy, big 
installations implemented with the SOIS business model may not be financially viable for 
people that look for a decent return of investment. It is also important to note that roofs of 
that size may be difficult to find in Switzerland.
Profitability for such large installations may be difficult to improve. Given the fact that panel 
prices are now the lesser cost part of total investment costs and very high labour costs in 
Switzerland, the investment costs cannot be expected to decrease much in the near future. 
This analysis was confirmed by all interviewed experts. Increasing self-consumption may be 
one way to boost a project’s profitability. Another element that can be influenced up to a 
certain degree is solar radiation. Switzerland is small but features significant differences in 
altitude. Solar radiation increases in higher locations. At the same time these places tend to 
be cooler, increasing solar panels’ efficiencies and sunnier because there is less fog. Finding 
locations in suitable regions may increase electricity production up to values normally found 
in southern Europe. However, big commercial roofs tend to be available more easily in big 
cities mostly located in lower altitudes, limiting the potential of such a strategy.
5.2.4 Scenario Portugal
Compared to all examined scenarios in Switzerland, installing panels in Portugal is clearly 
more interesting from a financial point of view. In the calculated financial model for Portugal 
(400 kWp), one panel can earn EUR 623 resulting in a MIRR of 4.27% over 25 years, which 
is considerably more than in all Swiss scenarios.
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Estimated investment costs are EUR 0.38 per Wp lower than in Switzerland but this positive 
effect is almost nullified by lower electricity prices for commercial locations. The most 
significant reason for the better financial viability is the difference in solar radiation, which is 
at least 50% higher in Portugal compared to Switzerland. This fact causes such a large 
advantage that only a very unlikely combination of significantly worse than predicted other 
variables could weaken the financial result to the level of a Swiss installation. 
These current figures do not take into account a potential future compensation tax. 
However, even after including the higher rate of the tax it was found that the 400 kWh 
project can still earn a MIRR of 3.6%. See section 5.2.5 for a discussion of the robustness of 
the financial scenarios.
The Portuguese financial scenario looks very interesting for Swiss panel buyers that are 
willing to accept a greater geographical distance and possibly higher perceived risks. As 
already mentioned in section 5.1 this depends very much on the level of trust that the SSC is 
able to build with its customers. According to the interviews, it can be expected that a 
significant number of buyers may be willing to have their panel installed in Portugal. It is also 
worth pointing out that there are close relationships between Switzerland and Portugal. In 
2014, there were 262 000 Portuguese citizens without Swiss passport living in Switzerland 
(Bundesamt für Statistik, 2015b) making them the third biggest group of foreign nationals. 
Accounting for naturalised Portuguese, they may well number around 300 000. This group 
may be particularly interested in such an investment opportunity in their country of origin. 
Another condition is the ability of the SSC to identify roof-owners with sufficiently big roofs 
and willing to engage in a long-term commitment to have solar panels installed on their roofs 
against a reasonable renting fee or preferential electricity prices. No detailed analysis of this 
condition has been carried out and experts differ on the interest of companies. One 
Portuguese expert stated that companies may be very interested in a contract that guarantees 
stable electricity costs in the long-term, while another expert thought that available incentives 
may not be sufficient for companies to engage in such long-term contracts.
5.2.5 Robustness of Financial Model
The robustness test in section 4.3.2 allows an appreciation of  the sensitivity of  the financial 
model to changes in important parameters. However, it depends on the extent of  the change 
of  the individual parameters. Therefore, the following analysis has a limited generalisability.
It is important to note that the robustness test as such does not say anything about the 
probability of  such unexpected changes in parameters. That being said, some changes are 
more likely to occur than others. For instances, based on available information, it is relatively 
unlikely that electricity prices decrease significantly in the future. On the other hand, it can 
reasonably be expected that investment costs continue to decrease in the following years 
(GMT Research, 2015). This means that it is likely that the SOIS business model becomes 
more financially viable over time. 
The importance of  investment costs and of  electricity prices for financial viability has been 
made very clear in the robustness analysis. Furthermore, it seems that the compensation to 
the roof-owner is much less influential or, in other words, even a significantly higher 
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compensation for using a roof  would not make the SOIS business model unviable. Likewise, 
the analysis shows that the planned compensation tax in Portugal does not render the SOIS 
business model unviable. This even more so because for the calculation of  the effect it was 
assumed that a project would need to pay the compensation over the full 10 years. However, 
in reality, there is an undetermined transition period. It will take several years to reach the 1% 
and 3% thresholds and projects that are commissioned in the next years will face a 
significantly shorter or – if  the market develops slowly – no compensation tax period. See 
section 4.2.3 for more details. For projects implemented in the future and thus paying 
compensation for the full 10 years, lower investment costs may partly compensate for the 
compensation tax.
An increase of  the share of  revenue for the SSC by 10% reduces financial return in Swiss 
scenarios below acceptable levels. However, in the Portuguese scenario, a MIRR of  3.71% 
may be acceptable for panel owners. In fact such a strategy may be even desirable for them 
because it significantly improves the financial viability of  the SSC and thus reduces their 
investment risk. 
5.2.6 Financial Viability for the Solar Service Company
One important aspect of financial viability concerns the SSC itself. Particularly in the case of 
small installations – even if they would provide a decent return for buyers – the SSC may not 
be able to manage a multitude of small project without spending over-proportionally high 
overheads on a per panel basis.
The author has run a hypothetical financial simulation (see chapter 4.3.3) of how the SSC 
might be able to scale up business activities using figures from the Portuguese financial 
scenario. It is important to note that the assumptions are highly hypothetical and have a 
startup setting in mind. Nevertheless, it allows to gain a general understanding of the salaries 
that the SSC would be able to pay. In the case study it was found that the SSC may be able to 
pay EUR 1250 000 in salaries after five years of operation. This would allow to employ two 
staff at average or three staff at low Swiss salaries, which besides new project development 
would need to manage about 23 000 panels, 15 locations (including potentially 15 SPEs) and 
10 000 customers assuming that every buyer purchases 2.3 panels on average. In the 
robustness analysis, it has been calculated that a share of 30% for the SSC would result in an 
income of EUR 267 340 after 5 years providing significant additional resources for managing 
and developing the business. 
No effort has been made to inquire into the organisational challenges of the SSC but it is 
obvious that the financial viability of the SSC depends very much on its ability to efficiently 
manage all these panels and customers and automate and simplify processes. However, it also 
becomes clear that even a very efficient SSC may not be able to generate sufficient income to 
finance salaries in the start-up phase from its share from panel revenues alone. Therefore, it 
needs to rely partially on non-salaried work, find other sources of income or start with more 
capital giving it more time to become profitable. 
In terms of the roles the SSC may fill out, several possibilities are feasible. It may, as was 
mostly hypothesised in this study, restrict its role to simply be a service provider, outsourcing 
tasks such as legal advice, solar panel installation and controlling, website management, etc. 
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But it may also decide to develop competencies in one or several of these fields. If it was 
able, for example, to build the solar parks itself, it could eliminate a significant source of 
value loss because solar installers have their own margins. If it could hire a legal expert, it 
may save significant cost related to the development and implementation of contracts with 
roof-owners, owners and potentially the creation and management of SPEs. But all of these 
choices require great effort and may strain scarce resources particularly in the start-up phase. 
Given the assumptions, the financial viability of the SOIS business model for the SSC 
particularly in the startup phase needs to be questioned. However, the chosen scope and the 
available data do not allow to draw more detailed conclusions regarding this question. 
Further research will be suggested in the conclusion.
5.3 Reflections on Business Models Components
The study sheds light on the four business model components mentioned in chapter 4.1.1. It 
has become clear that the SOIS business model creates value for the SSC by working as a 
service provider relieving panel owners from time investment, reducing risk and providing 
additional financial return on their savings in exchange for a share of  revenues from their 
panels’ electricity production. In regard to the market component, the existence of  a group 
of  interested small-scale investors can reasonably be assumed based on the analysis of  20 
interviews, provided that the SSC manages to address their worries and needs. In regard to 
internal capabilities, the study has produced insight in some conditions for the SSC to 
succeed. Namely, it needs to scale up fast and to establish an efficient customer and panel 
management system in order to keep administrative cost per panel in check. Compared to 
associations, the SOIS business model allows to invest in solar energy without committing 
time and engage in decision making. Compared to shares, interviewees liked the reduced risk 
and the more concrete investment object. Finally, the financial model developed indicates 
financial preferences for medium sized projects in Switzerland or, promising a significantly 
higher return, for big projects in Portugal. Sticking to Morris’ et al. (2005) terminology, the 
key to successfully implementing the SOIS model is to develop unique solutions that cannot 
easily be copied and that provide a sustainable competitive advantage.
5.4 Reflections on Investment Decision Theory
In chapter 2, investment decision-making theory has been presented. Based on this theory, it 
was deemed important to have the second round of  interviews ascertaining investment 
criteria, attitudes, perceived advantages and disadvantages of  the SOIS business model of  
potential customers in order to assess their interest to invest. The case study confirmed the 
notion that psychological factors and cognitive processes influence rational assessment of  
risk and returns. 
Following the logic of the investment decision-making framework, participants in the 
interviews were given information about the SOIS business model and then supposed to 
process this information according to their attitudes and preferences and finally indicate their 
investment criteria, perceived risks, advantages and disadvantages in order to draw a 
conclusion about whether they may be interested to invest. The interviews confirmed the 
hypothesis that real risks and returns are not very important to this group of potential 
investors since they rarely ever asked for details on risk and financial return. Responses 
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generally highlighted the importance of  the psychological factors included in the investment 
decision-making framework. One exception may be status. According to the results, status is 
not a relevant factor for or against the SOIS business model. However, interest and belief  in 
solar technology as well as ecological values of  the interviewees clearly contributed to the 
positive attitude towards the SOIS business model. Likewise, national, in this case, Swiss 
investment culture probably has a positive influence on the perception of  the SOIS business 
model by favouring a conservative, risk averse strategy, as well as a reluctance to engage in 
the stocks market and to invest time in managing money. Path dependency, on the other 
hand, works against the SOIS business model because in the interviews it became clear that 
most people while being unsatisfied with current returns of  their savings are not enough 
upset to put in much energy for searching for alternatives. The discussions with interviewees 
further showed that investment decisions are not completely based on perceived risk and 
expected return. Several interviewees stated that they did not consider risk to be particularly 
low but that they would still be interested for other reasons. It can be concluded that other 
advantages and disadvantages (see next section) play an important role in investment decision 
making.
While some interview questions explore the reasons for interviewees’ opinions, no attempt to 
comprehensively analyse all psychological aspects has been undertaken because interviewees 
refer to a hypothetical situation that does not require the same level of reflection than would 
a real decision. The fact of not analysing real decisions and their criteria and motivations is a 
major limitation of the study. Maybe future research can take up from here and use it to 
analyse real decisions. 
On the other hand, the gained understanding of  investment decision processes has several 
important consequences for the SOIS model. First, the willingness to engage with the SOIS 
business model depends a lot on the trust of  investors to the SSC, a fact that was highlighted 
by multiple interviewees. Therefore, trust building is highly important for this business model 
to succeed and should be prioritised. Second, worries about a variety of  risks need to be 
taken into account. The interviews show that many potential buyers lack information and 
believe in a significant number of  half-truths and misconceptions that may contribute to an 
overestimation of  technological and financial risk. Worries about technological obsolescence 
of  solar panels and energy payback time can easily be alleviated with appropriate 
information. The Fraunhofer Institute (2014) shows that solar panels in southern Europe 
produce as much energy as was needed for their production in about one year. Also, the 
same author demonstrates that panel efficiency improvement is a linear and relatively slow 
process and therefore, that today’s panel will most likely still be technically viable in 20-30 
years. However, this needs to be given proper attention by the SSC and managed by pursuing 
a transparent and proactive communication policy towards its potential and actual customers. 
5.5 Reflections on Buyer’s Preferences
The interviews brought up many good questions and insights on the perception of  
advantages and disadvantages of  the SOIS business model. 
What seems to be particularly relevant is the strong preference for not investing time and 
attention to deal with saving and financial matters. Many participants seem to prioritise less 
time investment over higher financial return. It is interesting to note that low interest rates, 
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rather than changing interviewees’ saving behaviour seem to change their expectations for 
financial return on their savings. In the discussion, multiple interviewees noted that they do 
not expect money in their savings accounts to multiply but to keep its value. Although it is 
possible that financial return becomes more important for other investments than bank 
saving accounts, the author did not find such indications for small-scale investments during 
the interviews. While the limited value of  financial return may seem surprising it can 
probably at least partly be explained by the fact that the SOIS business model does not ask 
buyers to make strategic investment decisions with a big overall impact on their personal 
finances. Rather, it gives them the opportunity to invest small amounts of  money. The author 
believes that this feature is instrumental for the buyers’ tendency to value environmental 
benefit and innovativeness of  the SOIS business model value proposition. Also, it may 
reduce perceived risk much more than any legal construction aimed at protecting the owners’ 
panels. 
This has consequences for the added value that the SOIS business model may be able to 
offer. Namely, the possibility of  investing a small amount of  money as well as the aspect of  
not requiring much time effort and small risks seems to be more important than providing a 
high return. If  this analysis is correct, even relatively low-return projects in Switzerland may 
be acceptable to customers. Such projects would also add additional value to those buyers 
that – while accepting that their panel be installed in Portugal – expressed a preference to 
have it nearby in Switzerland. Independent of  return expectations, interviewees are 
distinctively risk averse and risk perception has been confirmed in the interviews as 
important investment decision factor.
Interviewees are concerned about the stability and the viability of  the SSC. Being a new 
company pursuing a new business model, the SSC needs to focus on transparent information 
and trust building with its customers. However, it is likely that it will only be able to build 
trust and to reach beyond the early adopters if  it can build successful demonstration projects.
The case study provides a somewhat ambiguous picture in regard to the role of  ownership. 
While the possibility to own a solar panel seems to be attractive to most interviewees, it does 
not seem to make a big difference to them. Most rather consider this feature as nice to have. 
However, this does not mean ownership is irrelevant. To the contrary, the possibility to own 
and control a panel including the possibility to sell it at will may favourably distinguish the 
SOIS business model from alternatives such as associations and stocks. Also, as suggested by 
the theory in section 2.1 and confirmed in discussions with the interviewees, psychological 
factors may make a significant difference in deciding for or against investing in one particular 
business model.
As already stated in the previous section it is important to deal with several misconception 
about solar panels that are commonly believed even by people with generally positive 
attitudes towards solar energy.
5.6 Methodological Discussion
This study pursued a qualitative approach combining literature research with two sets of  
interviews. In the following, the author will reflect on the methodological approach and the 
generalisability and limitations of  the study. 
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5.6.1 Methodological Approach
The literature research was useful to determine important factors for the investment decision 
process and thereby to identify appropriate questions for the interviews with potential 
buyers. Also, it yielded essential data and inputs for the calculation of  the financial scenarios 
and for the interviews with experts both in Switzerland and in Portugal. 
The interviews with experts were essential to complete, update, confirm and triangulate data 
obtained in the literature research and brought up important legal challenges (see chapter 4.1) 
specific to the new elements of  the SOIS business model that were not covered in the 
literature. 
The interviews with potential clients allowed addressing the second research question and 
determine the clients’ preferences and attitudes towards solar energy in general and towards 
the SOIS business model in particular.
Both data collection methods successfully provided the data that allowed to carry out the 
case study. The case study was a suitable method to analyse several components of  the SOIS 
business model. Overall, the author concludes that the chosen methodological approach was 
appropriate to reach the goal of  the study and allowed to analyse the research questions. 
5.6.2 Generalisability and Limitations
Using a qualitative methodology with a limited sample of  interviewed people, the study does 
not aspire to statistical representativeness of  its results. Also, the limited time available 
restricted the number of  people that could be interviewed.
A number of  important choices in regard to the sample have been made (see chapter 3.2.3). 
These choices produced a sample in a rather narrow age span that features an above average 
education, concern about the environment and interest in solar energy. This is in line with 
the declared aim to interview people that may be potential initial customers of  the SOIS 
business model. This aim was fulfilled but the procedure also has downsides. The study’s 
conclusion whether the SOIS business model meets to investment criteria of  potential 
buyers is also limited to this relatively narrow sample of  people. The study’s results may be 
generalisable to the overall population only to a limited extent. Overall, this seems to be a 
legitimate trade-off  in order to have higher involvement of  interviewees.
Another limitation is the generalisability to other countries. Some answers from the 
interviews with potential investors may be specific for Switzerland. Therefore, more research 
would be needed in order to determine other nationalities preferences and attitudes for the 
SOIS business model. See chapter 6. 
The study did not examine all elements of  the SOIS business model relevant to its successful 
implementation, which may negatively impact its generalisability. Due to time constraints, the 
financial viability of  the SSC has not been researched in detail and the developed scenario in 
section 4.3.3 relies on assumptions that could not be backed up with real data. Also, the study 
did not look into the organisation challenges of  managing a great number of  clients, panels 
and projects. Furthermore, the study has delivered only limited insights regarding the 
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interests of  the third important party to the SOIS model: the roof-owners. While it may be 
reasonable to assume that the multiple, including but not exclusively financial, benefits are 
attractive to them, more information about their interests and requirements are needed to 
assess the overall viability of  the model.
These limitations lead to several suggestions for further research in the concluding chapter 6.
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6 Conclusions
In the concluding chapter, the author summarises the results, reflects upon their relevancy 
and on how the study is able to answer the research questions. Also, suggestions for future 
research will be presented.
6.1 Answers to Research Questions
This study has examined the small-scale, off-site investment in solar energy business model 
(SOIS). It used literature research and two sets of semi-structured interviews with experts 
and with potential investors to answer the following two research questions:
1. How viable is the SOIS business model in Switzerland and in Portugal from a 
financial and legal perspective?
2. How does the SOIS business model fulfil investment criteria for Swiss small-scale 
investors?
In regard to the first research question, the study concludes that the SOIS model is 
financially viable for investors for medium-sized solar installations in Switzerland yielding a 
Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR) of 2.67% compared to the return of currently 
0.11% on bank saving accounts, see section 4.3.1 for more detail. Installing the panels in 
large projects in Portugal yields a MIRR of 4.27% and is much more financially attractive 
than all Swiss scenarios. However, a number of conditions apply. For instance, legal 
challenges in regard to ownership and guarantee of continued operation in case of an 
insolvency of the Solar Service Company (SSC) need to be resolved. Additionally, roof-
owners willing to engage in a long-term contract need to be found. Also, the study has 
demonstrated that the financial viability of the SOIS business model for the SSC is 
questionable and relies on relatively big project sizes, on the capability to scale-up fast and on 
very efficient management procedures to bring down investment costs per panel and to 
generate the necessary revenues.
In regard to the second research question it is found that the SOIS business model meets 
several of  the interviewed potential small-scale investors’ criteria. 
• It offers a small investment opportunity in a concrete and tangible solar panel;
• It relieves investors from administrative burden usually associated with investment 
activity other than bank saving accounts; 
• It enables them to contribute to an innovative business idea with environmental 
benefits;
• It provides them with a better financial return than a bank-savings account.
By far the most important doubt of the interviewees was the fact that the SSC is a new and 
small company and that it is unsure if it would be successful in the long run. They feared that 
even with ownership of the panels, it may be difficult requiring additional time and financial 
investment to continue operating them if the SSC would become insolvent. Such potentially 
significant transaction costs constitute a risk inherent to the SOIS business model. Because 
of this risk, they stressed the need to establish a high level of trust and provide transparent 
information about the projects. It became also apparent that a number of outdated 
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perceptions and opinions for example regarding long energy payback times of solar panels 
persist among the target customer group. Careful information is important to manage and 
update such perceptions. 
Interviewees highlighted that they wish to be able to sell their panels prematurely and it was 
suggested that the SSC guarantee to buy them back. Given that possibility, the expected 
revenue, payback times, etc. were not a major worry for most interviewees. The study 
suggests that the target group prioritises little time investment, innovativeness and 
environmental benefits over return when evaluating the SOIS business model. The low 
priority of financial return may be related to the fact that interviewees evaluated it from the 
perspective of investing only a small share of their savings.
6.2 Relevancy of Results
While some alternative investment models for small-scale investors are available, they usually 
involve giving loans, buying shares of  a project or becoming a member in a solar association, 
se. All these approaches pool money from many small investors and cede various degrees of  
control and accordingly involve different amounts of  risks for them. Based on discussions 
with experts, the author concludes that the SOIS business model is innovative and introduces 
a new element in the solar financing landscape in Switzerland: the idea that investors buy and 
own panels off-site. Consequently, preferences and attitudes of  potential buyers regarding 
the ownership element as well as the legal and financial viability of  the SOIS business model 
have not yet been examined and the study addresses a relevant knowledge-gap. Additionally, 
comparing the Swiss solar market conditions with the Portuguese market, the study provides 
an additional value and demonstrates that with the new bill in Portugal, installing panels there 
is more financially profitable than operating them in Switzerland.
6.3 Future Research
The study leaves several important issues regarding the SOIS business model for future 
research:
First, the legal model needs to be developed. In particular, it needs to be clarified to what 
extent the panel owners are protected in the case of  an insolvency of  the SSC. The author 
recommends to look further into the possibility to set up project-based Special Purpose 
Entities. This may simultaneously protect the panel owners against problems related to a 
bankruptcy of  the SSC and insulate the SSC against project related problems. For the 
examined business model, it is important that this research extends to Portugal and other 
off-site locations attractive to solar energy. 
Second, further research should deal with the scalability of the SOIS model to larger 
demographic buyer groups than the one targeted in this study. In order to scale up, the SSC 
eventually also needs to go beyond the small Swiss market and more countries need to be 
included in future research.
Third, future research may include the potential of emerging energy storage and management 
technologies to increase the rate of self-consumption of roof-owners, which may 
substantially increase the overall profitability of projects.
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Fourth, in chapter 2.2 six typical components of business models have been identified 
however not all have been studied in the same detail. The internal capabilities as well as growth 
of the SSC and the competition component have not been given priority in this study and 
deserve more attention in future research.  
Fifth, more research is needed to learn more about the preferences of the roof-owners. In 
the study is has been found that companies may be motivated to be a partner in the SOIS 
business model if the SSC can guarantee stable electricity prices at moderate discounts. 
However, more insight regarding additional motivations such as CSR considerations would 
benefit the understanding of the overall viability of the SOIS business model.
Sixth, it may be worthwhile to look into how energy policies can facilitate the emergence of 
business models in solar energy for tenants and generally for small-scale investors. Such 
policies may be attractive for policy makers because involving more people as stakeholder in 
the necessary energy transition may increase its acceptability and political feasibility. 
Finally, the SSC needs to answer the question what happens after the end of the contract 
after 25 years. Most panels may continue to work when the contract expires and they are still 
owned by the investors. Research could look into the new contractual arrangements needed 
at that point in the future. Also, it needs to be clarified who has responsibilities for the end-
of-life treatment of the panels.
The study has provided interesting insights in the financial and legal viability, customer 
preferences and in the overall feasibility of implementing the SOIS business model in 
Switzerland and in Portugal. However, only real life experience may tell whether the findings 
of this thesis are valid, whether the SSC is be able to attract enough customers, overcome the 
legal challenges, find suitable roofs and handle the administration of customers, projects and 
panels with the available income.
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Annex 1: Interview Lists With Experts in Switzerland and 
in Portugal
Switzerland
1
2
3
4
5
6
Portugal
1
2
3
Name
Christian Moll
Peter Toggweiler
Thomas Grädel
David Galeuchet
Christian Kilchhofer
Christoph Oliver Schmid
Karl Moosdorf
Nuno Brito Jorge
Joana Fernandes
Organisation / Company
Swissolar
Basler & Hofmann AG
Alternative Bank Schweiz
Solarmarkt Schweiz
Ecoptima AG
Stierlin Law
Associação Portuguesa de Empresas do 
Sector Fotovoltaic
Boa Energia
Portuguese National Energy Agency
Date
2015-06-16
2015-06-22
2015-07-03
2015-07-09
2015-07-28
2015-07-30
2015-07-14
2015-07-15
2015-07-17
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Annex 2: Interview Questions for Potential Investors
#
1
2
3
4
#
5
6
7
8
9
10
#
11
Introduction
What do you think about climate change?
What would you be ready to do in order to help stopping climate change?
Pay higher energy costs
Eat less meat
Fly less
Drive a smaller car / don’t own a car
Invest in renewable energy production
What do you know about solar energy?
How do you view solar energy, what is your attitude?
General Investment Questions
Are you personally able to save money?
Are you satisfied with the return on your savings? 
Have you looked into alternative investment possibilities?
How important are the following criteria to decide how to invest money?
Little risk
High financial return
Little additional work
Social benefit. Status, demonstrate values
Environmental benefit
Other
Do you consider investing in renewable / solar energy?
Regarding investing in renewable energy, what are additional motivations?
Self-consumption, independence from utility / the grid
Reduce dependency from global energy markets
Knowing people that have done it
Other
Explanation of  the SOIS business model
How do you assess alternative options?
Investing in stocks
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
#
21
22
23
24
Member in a foundation
What do you think about the SOIS model?
What advantages do you see?
What disadvantages / barriers do you see?
How would owning a solar panel make you feel?
Do you think owning a panel influences the risk of  an investment?
How does the reliance on subsidies of  a business model influence your investment decision?
How important is the feeling to be part of  a community?
If  you were to invest in solar energy, how important would the possibility to self-consume the 
electricity be?
Would the place where the solar panel is installed matter to you? (private or commercial roof, public 
building, social institution or NGO)
If  you would buy panels, would you be ready to have them installed in another country?
If  yes, under what conditions?
Do you any preferences in regard to countries? What about Portugal?
Socio-demographic questions
Gender
Age
20 - 30
30 - 40
40 - 50
50 - 60
60 - 70
70 - 80
What is your education?
University or equivalent
Professional degree
Do you own your house / flat?
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Annex 3: Interviews Questions for Experts in 
Switzerland
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
#
14
15
16
17
18
#
19
20
21
22
Financial Questions
What are the latest system prices per Wp for 5 kWp, 30 kWp and 400 kWp systems?
How much is maintenance and insurance?
How are the FIT reference prices determined? How should they be interpreted?
What installations sizes are the most viable currently in Switzerland?
The literature indicates that 1 kWh can be produced per Wp installed capacity per year. Is this 
realistic? What is the performance ratio?
What is your assessment of  the future development of  investment costs in Switzerland?
How does the EU price limit / trade dispute with China influence the solar market and prices in 
Switzerland?
What is your analysis in regard to the development of  the feed-in price for electricity that is not 
self-consumed?
Is there a limit to self-consumption?
What is your assessment in regard to the development of  electricity prices? How will deregulation 
affect them?
What is the current trend in regard to panel efficiencies?
What is the standard guarantee?
Does the guarantee cover other installation items such as cables, inverters, etc.?
Explanation of  SOIS business model
What do you think about the model?
What advantages do you see?
What disadvantage do you see?
Do you think the fact of  owning gives a sense of  security and is something buyers value?
Do you know of  similar models in Switzerland?
Subsidy Related Questions
Is the FIT available for new installations?
Can the SSC claim the One-Off  Investment Grant on behalf  of  the owners?
How much money is left in the One-Off  Investment Grant scheme? Will the CHF 135 million be 
replenished? How long is it going to last, what happens afterwards?
Do you see any consequences of  the 3 party (Panel owner, roof  owner and service company) 
setting in regard to the One-Off  Investment Grant?
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#
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
#
31
32
#
33
34
35
36
37
Legal Questions
Are panel owners really protected in a bankruptcy of  the SSC?
Can the company negotiate and register the right to use the roof  under its name on behalf  of  the 
panel owner but the panel owner retains legal ownership independently from the company?
What could be the role of  a Special Purpose Entity in the SOIS business model?
How can the Special Purpose Entity be insulated from a failure of  the company?
Are liability questions likely a problem here? If  yes, how to solve them?
Can the service company have a contract with the buyer of  the electricity even though it does not 
own the panels?
Can a roof-owner self-consume electricity from panels that it does not own?
Open question: Do you see any other legal issues with this kind of  arrangement. What are biggest 
challenges with such an arrangement?
Taxes Related Questions
Can the owner deduct the investment costs from income taxes even though he/she does not 
install the panels on his / her roof?
What tax regime applies? The panels are private property but installed on commercial property, 
how does it work? 
Investment Related Questions
How big is the market segment of  people interested in sustainable investments?
What segments of  the population is particularly interested in sustainable investment? Education, 
age, income
How is the sustainable investment market developing?
What is the motivation to invest in renewables?
High Environmental benefit
Self-consumption, independence from utility / the grid
Reduce dependency from global energy markets
Innovation; solar is the future
High financial return
Knowing people that have done it
Demonstrating green mindedness
Other?
How much money do Swiss park in savings accounts? 
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Annex 4: Interviews Questions for Expert in Portugal
#
#
#
Financial
What are the latest system prices per Wp for various capacities?
How much is maintenance and insurance?
What is the yearly output in Portugal? Average w/m2, kWh / m2.
How much is the performance ratio?
How high is the electricity price for consumers and for commercial users?
What is your assessment of  the future development of  investment costs in Portugal?
What is your assessment of  future electricity costs in Portugal?
Regulation / Subsidies
Are there any subsidies in Portugal or has it been completely replaced with the right to self-
consume?
How long do you expect a typical installation process to take?
UPAC: Can you please elaborate how the dimension calculation works?
How is self-consumption defined? Does it need to be on the same area? Would it be possible that 
one company builds solar panels and has a direct wire to another company for ”self-consumption”?
What is your assessment of  the compensation tax linked to the CIEG? 
UPAC: for how much can excess electricity be sold to the grid?
What is the current level of  solar?
UPP: What is the feed-in price for electricity?
UPP: There is a cap of  20MW per year. What happens to the excess applications? Waiting list?
UPP: Can you please elaborated on how the dimension calculation works?
Is there any legal modification planned at this point? Is there a risk of  regulation change that could 
affect the SOIS business model?
The current regulation is still quite new. Do you have first experiences? How does the market react, 
how is it implemented?
Do you have any projection about the effects?
Legal
What are the market entry conditions for foreign capital in the solar market in Portugal?
Do you see legal or other issues with implementing the SOIS business model?
Can a roof-owner ”self-consume” electricity from panels that it does not own?
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Annex 5: Financial Scenario Switzerland Small 
Installation
Number of  years
Number of  panels
Production per year baseline
Solar panel area
Solar panel efficiency
Solar panel power rating / nominal output
Solar insolation
Production yearly changes
Decrease in capacity per year
Gross revenues per year baseline
Self-consumption
Utility rate for roof-owner (CHF per kWh)
Discount for selling electricity to roof-owner
Sell price to roof-owner = revenue from self-
consumption (CHF per kWh)
Price for excess production (CHF per kWh)
Revenues yearly changes
Inflation + increase of  electricity price per year
Costs of  investments baseline
Investment costs (CHF / Wp)
Subsidies on investment costs (30%)
Costs Yearly Changes
Maintenance per year (of  gross investment)
Profitability for panel owner(s)
Gross revenue over 25 years (including reinvestment of  
receipts)
Net revenue over 25 years (including reinvestment of  
receipts)
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) 
average per year
Payback time in years
kWh
m2
kWp
kWh / m2
%
CHF
35%
0.23
5%
0.22
0.11
0.50%
CHF
3.00
CHF
CHF
CHF
CHF
25
20
All panels
5 200
50
16%
5.20
1 000
0.65%
753
398
355
10 920
15 600
-4 680
1%
13 165
2 244
592
23.42
1 panel
260
1.63
0.26
38
546
658
112
39
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Rate of  return for owner(s)
Interest rate for discounting
Discount rate for negative cashflow
Interest rate for reinvestment of  positive cashflow from 
project (receipts)
Internal Rate of  Return (IRR)
Modified Internal Rate of  Return (MIRR)
Net Present Value (NPV)
Income for Service Company
Income per year in CHF (average of  25 years including 
variable revenues)
Income over 25 years
Average income for roof-owner per year
Panel price for buyer
CHF
20%
CHF
CHF
CHF
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
0.50%
0.75%
-654.7
116
2 910
21
6
146
1.05
546
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Annex 6: Financial Scenario Switzerland Medium 
Installation
Number of  years
Number of  panels
Production per year baseline
Solar panel area
Solar panel efficiency
Solar panel power rating / nominal output 
Solar insolation
Production yearly changes
Decrease in capacity per year
Gross revenues per year baseline
Self-consumption
Utility rate for roof-owner (CHF per kWh)
Discount for roof-owner
Sell price to roof-owner = revenue from self-consumption 
(CHF per kWh)
Price for excess production (CHF per kWh)
Revenues yearly changes
Inflation + increase of  electricity price per year
Costs of  investments baseline
Investment costs (CHF / Wp)
Subsidies on investment costs (1400+(500/kWp))
Costs yearly changes
Maintenance per year (of  gross investment)
Profitability without discounting for owner(s)
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 
years
Net revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 
years
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) average 
per year
Payback time in years
kWh
m2
kWp
kWh / m2
%
80%
0.23
5%
0.22
0.11
0.50%
2.50
CHF
CHF
CHF
25
115
All panels
29 900
290
16%
29.9
1 000
0.65%
5 854
5 227
628
58,400.00
74 750
-16 350
1%
112 941
54 541
4 517
13.1
1 panel
260.00
1.63
0.26
51
507.83
982
474
39
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Rate of  return for owner(s)
Interest rate for discounting
Discount rate for negative cashflow
Interest rate for reinvestment of  positive cashflow from 
project (receipts)
Internal Rate of  Return (IRR)
Modified Internal Rate of  Return (MIRR)
Net Present Value (NPV)
Income for service company
Income per year in CHF (average of  25 years including 
variable revenues)
Income over 25 years
Income for roof-owner per year
Panel price for buyer
CHF
20%
CHF
CHF
CHF
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
4.68%
2.67%
29 667
999
24 971
275.08
8.7
217
2.39
508
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Annex 7: Financial Scenario Switzerland Large 
Installation
Number of  years
Number of  panels
Production per year baseline
Solar panel area
Solar panel efficiency
Solar panel power rating / nominal output 
Solar insolation
Production yearly changes
Decrease in capacity per year
Gross revenues per year baseline
Self-consumption
Utility rate for roof-owner (CHF per kWh)
Discount for selling electricity to roof-owner
Sell price to roof-owner = revenue from self-consumption 
(CHF per kWh)
Price for excess production (CHF per kWh)
Revenues yearly changes
Inflation + increase of  electricity price per year
Costs of  investments baseline
Investment costs (CHF / Wp)
Costs yearly changes
Maintenance per year (of  gross investment)
Profitability without discounting for owner(s)
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 
years
Net revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 
years
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) average 
per year
Payback including reinvestment of  receipts
Rate of  return for owner(s)
kWh
m2
kWp
kWh / m2
%
80%
0.17
5%
0.16
0.06
0.50%
1.80
CHF
CHF
CHF
25
1 539
All panels
400 140
3 800
16%
400
1 000
0.65%
56 499
51 698
4 802
720 252
720 252
1%
1 090 2234
369 972
43 609
16.6
1 panel
 260
1.63
0.26
37
468.00
708
240
28
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Interest rate for discounting
Discount rate for negative cashflow
Interest rate for reinvestment of  positive cashflow from 
project (receipts)
Internal Rate of  Return (IRR)
Modified Internal Rate of  Return (MIRR)
Net Present Value
Income for service company
Income per year in CHF (average of  25 years including 
variable revenues)
Income over 25 years
Income for roof-owner per year
Panel price for buyer
CHF
20%
CHF
CHF
CHF
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
2.40%
1.67%
129 870
9 642
241 043
2 721
6.2
157
1.8
468.00
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Annex 8: Financial Scenario Portugal
Number of  years
Number of  panels
Production per year baseline
Solar panel area
Solar panel efficiency
Solar panel power rating / nominal output 
Solar insolation
Production yearly changes
Decrease in capacity per year
Gross revenues per year baseline
Self-consumption
Utility rate for roof-owner (EUR per kWh)
Discount for selling electricity to roof-owner
Sell price to roof-owner = revenue from self-consumption 
(EUR per kWh)
Price for excess production (EUR per kWh)
Revenues yearly changes
Compensation (CIEG = 20%), 30% / 50% of  CIEG
Inflation + increase of  electricity price per year
Costs of  investments baseline
Investment costs (EUR per Wp)
Taxes
Costs yearly changes
Maintenance and insurance per year (of  gross investment)
Profitability for owner(s)
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 
years
Net revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) over 25 years
Gross revenue (including reinvestment of  receipts) average 
per year
Payback time in years (including reinvestment of  receipts)
kWh
m2
kWp
kWh / m2
EUR
80%
0.12
5%
0.11
0.04
0%
2%
EUR
1.30
EUR
EUR
EUR
EUR
EUR
25
1 539
All panels
600 210
3 800
16%
400
1 500
0.65%
59 541
54 739
4 802
0.00%
520 932
520 182
750
1.00%
1 480 351
959 419
59 214
10
1 panel
390
1.63
0.26
39
338
961
623
38
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Rate of  return for owner(s)
Interest rate for discounting
Discount rate for negative cashflow
Interest rate for reinvestment of  positive cashflow from 
project (receipts)
Internal Rate of  Return (IRR)
Modified Internal Rate of  Return (MIRR)
Net Present Value
Income for service company
Income per year (average of  25 years including variable 
revenues)
Income over 25 years
Income for roof-owner per year
Panel price for buyer
EUR
20%
EUR
EUR
EUR
1.00%
1.00%
1.00%
8.26%
4.27%
633 399
13 202
330 050
2 881
8.6
214
1.87
338
